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Mr. Walter E. Hanson, Chairman 
Executive Committee 
SEC Practice Section 
Division for CPA Firms 
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Dear Mr. Hanson:
I am pleased to submit herewith the report of the Public 
Oversight Board on "Scope of Services by CPA Firms". This 
report is submitted in response to your request, on behalf of 
the Executive Committee, that the Board consider and express 
its views with respect to the proposed amendment to Section 
IV, 3(i), of the Organizational Structure and Functions of 
the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms.
This report was made available, in tentative form, to 
the Executive Committee and to the Chairman and the Chief 
Accountant of the Securities and Exchange Commission on 
February 6, 1979. We neither solicited nor received the 
approval or endorsement of either the Executive Committee 
or the SEC. While the report reflects in some respects 
comments received from those sources, it represents solely 
the views of the Board.
As indicated in the report under the caption "Conclusions 
and Recommendations", the Board has not viewed favorably the 
effort of the Executive Committee to engage in a series of 
determinations on hypothetical situations with respect to 
which management advisory service (MAS) engagements do, and 
which do not, involve skills related to accounting or auditing. 
The Board believes that this approach would involve the 
Executive Committee in an array of ad hoc judgements which 
would become, or appear to be, increasingly arbitrary, and 
that it lends itself to logical extensions beyond the policy 
purpose sought to be achieved. We believe that it is wiser 
for the Executive Committee to adhere to the concept of 
independence and the appearance thereof as sole the governing 
principle.
LOUIS W. MATUSIAK 
Executive Director
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The Board has also considered and rejected the more 
extreme view, expressed in the report of the Senate Sub­
committee on Reports, Accounting and Management, that 
auditors be prohibited from furnishing to audit clients any 
nonaudit services other than tax services and "certain 
computer and system analyses...necessary for improving 
internal control procedures of corporations". Such a 
draconian measure would not only deprive audit clients of 
services that they obviously deem valuable but also would 
cause a substantial reduction in revenues for many CPA firms, 
especially the smaller ones. We do not believe that otherwise 
lawful and productive economic activity should be prohibited 
unless such prohibition is clearly in the public interest 
and no other measures are available.
These conclusions should not be interpreted to mean 
that the Board views the matter of scope of services with 
complacency or believes that possible dangers can be avoided 
solely with general exhortations to the members to preserve 
independence. The mere fact that so many persons have 
expressed concern with the subject, both in and out of the 
government, over an extended period is reason to conclude 
that it cannot be dismissed as a chimera. The Board believes 
that there is possibility of damage to the profession and 
the users of the profession's services in an uncontrolled 
expansion of MAS to audit clients. Investors and others 
need a public accounting profession that performs its primary 
function of auditing financial statements with both the fact 
and the appearance of competence and independence. Develop­
ments which detract from this will surely damage the profes­
sional status of CPA firms and lead to suspicions and doubts 
that will be detrimental to the continued reliance of the 
public upon the profession without further and more drastic 
governmental intrusion. Effective measures must be taken to 
guard against such a development. Fortunately, in the Board's 
view, they are at hand.
The new proxy statement disclosures occasioned by ASR 
250 will largely remove the mystery surrounding the type and 
magnitude of actual services performed for reporting companies 
by auditing firms and will have a restraining influence to 
the degree that some services may be generally perceived as 
being incompatible with professional stature. The inclusion 
in peer reviews of an examination of MAS as they may bear on 
the reviewed firm's independence, including a review of the 
role performed by the reviewed firm in MAS engagement, will 
give further assurance of the maintenance of independence. 
Finally, the new encouragement for audit committees and boards 
of directors to be aware of the existence of MAS, to approve
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them, and in so doing to consider the matter of independence, 
will have a salutary effect. While these new developments 
may not change existing arrangements, which, of course, they 
need not, they should do much to allay suspicions.
The Board has considered whether it should attempt to 
suggest more specific guidance regarding what factors should 
be considered by audit committees and boards of directors 
in reaching judgments on the possible effect of a proposed 
MAS engagement on independence. In view of the manifold 
complexity of the total relationship between an accounting 
firm and an audit client and the infinite variations found 
in actual practice, the Board has decided that such an effort 
would be more misleading than helpful. Rather we believe 
that audit committees and boards of directors should consider 
all of the factors mentioned in the report as they may apply 
to a particular circumstance. To this end, member firms may 
find it useful to make copies of this report available to 
their clients.
We hope these views commend themselves to your favorable 
consideration.
Very truly yours,
J ohn J. McCloy 
Chairman
JJM/kae
Table of Contents
Page
Introduction 1
Conclusions and Recommendations 4
Preamble ............................................................................................  4
Background 7
Discussion of Scope Limitations 14
Approach to Problem 14
Benefits of MAS 16
SEC Practice Section—Existing and
Proposed Scope Limitations.......................................................  21
Compatibility or Image Criterion 22
Independence...............................................................................  26
Stated standards on independence 26
The effect of MAS on independence........................................  33
Actual Impairment 33
Appearance of Impairment ..............................................  36
Independence as an absolute ...................................................  38
Existing Safeguards ........................................................................... 41
Client Awareness and Public Exposure 41
Incentives for Independence 44
AICPA Peer Review Process 45
Specific Services Mentioned in the Organization
Document and Proposal ...........................................................  46
Marketing Consulting, Plant Layout and Design, Product 
Design and Analysis, and Employee Benefit Consulting 46
Actuarial Services ....................................................................  48
Executive Recruitment................................................................ 53
Summation 55
Addendum A
Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms 57
Addendum B
Proposed Amendments ....................................................................  63
Introduction
In July 1978, the Public Oversight Board (Board) of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA’s Division for CPA Firms published Notice 
of Public Hearing 78-1 (Notice) soliciting public comment and 
announcing oral hearings concerning the general subject of scope 
of services for member firms of the SEC Practice Section. Concep­
tually, the term “scope of services” could refer to any type of service 
performed by accounting firms,1 including accounting, auditing, tax, 
and a wide variety of so-called management advisory services, or 
“MAS.” When speaking of MAS in this report the Board is referring 
to any service other than accounting, auditing, or tax services fur­
nished by independent certified public accountants and firms with 
which they are associated. It includes such things as executive 
recruitment, actuarial services, profit planning and budget consulting, 
marketing analysis, financial planning and control services, data 
processing services, inventory control systems, plant layout, account­
ing systems design, and employee benefit plan consulting.
The Notice requested that the written comments and the oral 
testimony address a number of broad questions as well as a specific 
proposal of the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section 
(Proposal) to limit the scope of services a member firm may furnish 
to its audit clients who file audited financial statements with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter sometimes referred 
to as the “Commission” or the “SEC”).
The oral hearings were held on August 17-18, 1978; 31 witnesses 
delivered statements and were questioned by members of the Board 
and its staff. A transcript of those hearings was maintained.2 In 
addition, the Board received written statements from 152 commenta­
tors,3 and, as indicated in the Notice, the Board incorporated into its
1. In this report, the terms “accounting firms,” “CPA firms,” “public account­
ing firms,” “certified public accounting firms,” and “auditing firms” are used 
interchangeably. Similarly, the terms “accountant,” “CPA,” and “auditor” 
are used interchangeably.
2. References to that transcript will be cited herein as “POB Hearing 
Testimony.”
3. Comments were received from 89 accounting firms and individual public 
accountants, 12 consulting firms (including actuarial, data processing, and 
personnel consultants), 13 members of academia, 33 client companies, and 5 
miscellaneous commentators.
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record the approximately 400 written comments received by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to its request for com­
ments in Securities Act Release No. 5869 (September 26, 1977). 
Finally, numerous published articles, studies, and surveys relating to 
scope of services have served as background material for the Board 
and have, in part, been relied upon in formulating its conclusions.4 
This report contains a general discussion of the background giving
4. Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management, Committee on 
Government Affairs, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Improving 
the Accountability of Publicly Owned Corporations and Their Auditors (Com­
mittee Print 1977) (“Senate Report”); Staff of the Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting and Management, Committee on Government Affairs, United 
State Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., The Accounting Establishment: A Staff 
Study (1977) (“Senate Staff Report”); Securities and Exchange Commission, 
95th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and 
the Commission’s Oversight Role (Committee Print 1978) (“SEC Report to 
Congress”); The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities; Report, Con­
clusions, and Recommendations (New York 1978) (“Cohen Commission 
Report”); Committee on Scope and Structure, Final Report (AICPA 1974) 
(“1974 Final Report”); AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence, “Final 
Report,” Journal of Accountancy (December 1969) (“1969 Final Report”); 
An Opinion Survey of the Public Accounting Profession, sponsored by Deloitte 
Haskins & Sells and conducted by Reichman Research, Inc. (New York 1978); 
J. Rhode, “The Independent Auditor’s Work Environment: A Survey” (AICPA 
1978); The Balance Sheet: Top Executives Speak Out About CPA Firms, Wall 
Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company, Inc. 1978).
For individual commentators, see, e.g., W. Dreher and C. Graese, “The 
Compatibility of Actuarial Consulting and Auditing Services,” Journal of 
Accountancy (July 1978); T. Kelley and D. Roscetti, “Auditor/Actuary Re­
lations Under ERISA: From the Auditor’s Standpoint,” Journal of Account­
ancy (July 1978); B. Hazlehurst, “Auditor/Actuary Relations Under ERISA: 
As an Actuary Sees It,” Journal of Accountancy (July 1978); S. Klion, “MAS 
Practice: Are The Critics Justified?,” Journal of Accountancy (June 1978); 
D. Miller, “The Annual Audit Revisited,” Financial Executive (March 1978); 
D. Lavin, “Perceptions of the Independence of the Auditor,” Accounting 
Review (January 1976); R. Hartley and T. Ross, “MAS and Audit Independ­
ence: An Image Problem,” Journal of Accountancy (November 1972); G. 
Hobgood and J. Sciarrino, “Management Looks at Audit Services (Part II),” 
Financial Executive (August 1972); G. Hobgood and J. Sciarrino “Manage­
ment Looks at Audit Services,” Financial Executive (April 1972); P. Titard, 
“Independence and MAS—Opinions of Financial Statement Users,” Journal 
of Accountancy (July 1971); A. Briloff, “Old Myths and New Realities in 
Accountancy,” Accounting Review (July 1966); J. Carey and W. Doherty, 
“The Concept of Independence— Review and Restatement,” Journal of Ac­
countancy (January 1966); A. Schulte, “Compatibility of Management Consult­
ing and Auditing,” Accounting Review (July 1965).
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rise to the scope of services question, the existing and proposed re­
strictions on scope of services imposed and to be imposed by the SEC 
Practice Section, and the Board’s analyses and conclusions with 
respect to those restrictions and proposed restrictions as well as the 
question of limiting scope of services generally.5
5. This report is concerned with the performance of MAS by member firms 
of the SEC Practice Section for clients for whom they serve as independent 
public accountants rendering opinions on financial reports. For convenience, 
such clients are referred to as “audit clients.”
3
Conclusions and Recommendations
Preamble
The conclusions and recommendations contained in this section of 
the report reflect the Board’s views with respect to the specific scope 
of service limitations which are presently a condition of membership 
in the SEC Practice Section and those scope of service limitations 
which are embodied in the Proposal. While the Board’s general con­
clusions and recommendations might be viewed in some respects as 
more permissive than the existing and proposed scope of service 
limitations, this should not suggest that the Board perceives no prob­
lems associated with accounting firms furnishing all forms of MAS 
to audit clients. The most fundamental departure by the Board 
from the existing and proposed scope of service limitations appears 
in the Board’s treatment of those forms of MAS which do not impair 
auditor independence but which involve services not in accounting 
or financial related areas or which do not require skills related to 
accounting or auditing—that is, services which may impair the pro­
fessional image of an accountant but not his independence.
As discussed more fully in the body of this report, the Board is 
concerned with professional image but does not believe that rule- 
making is the appropriate way to address the problem. Rather, the 
Board believes it is preferable to rely on public disclosure, supple­
mented by the admonition to members of the SEC Practice Section 
to exercise self-restraint and judgment before venturing into new 
areas of MAS.
With this in mind, the Board has drawn the following conclusions 
and makes the following recommendations:
1. There are many potential benefits to be realized by permitting 
auditors to perform MAS for audit clients that should not be denied 
to such clients without a strong showing of actual or potential detri­
ment. The profession, therefore, should be careful not to impose 
unnecessarily broad prophylactic rules with respect to MAS and 
independence.
2. The Board generally concludes that mandatory limitations on 
scope of services should be predicated only on the determination 
that certain services, or the role of the firm performing certain ser­
vices, will impair a member’s independence in rendering an opinion 
on the fairness of a client’s financial statements or present a strong
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likelihood of doing so. Independence is generally defined as the 
ability to operate with integrity and objectivity. Integrity is an ele­
ment of character, and objectivity relates to the ability of an auditor 
to maintain impartiality of attitude and avoid conflicts of interest. All 
conflicts of interest are not avoidable and some conflicts of interest 
produce countervailing benefits. Such conflicts are accepted, con­
sistent with the concept of independence, because of practical necessity 
and the realization of important benefits, coupled with the fact that 
auditor integrity and various legal incentives provide adequate public 
protection. This helps explain public acceptance of the fact that 
auditors can be “independent” even though the client selects them 
and pays their fee. It also helps explain why there has been public 
acceptance of accounting firms furnishing a variety of tax advisory 
services to audit clients. Recognizing, therefore, that independence 
in an absolute sense cannot be achieved, when evaluating whether 
certain services should be prohibited, it is necessary to consider the 
potential benefits derived from the service and balance them against 
the possible or apparent impairment to the auditor’s objectivity.
3. At this time no rules should be imposed to prohibit specific 
services on the grounds that they are or may be incompatible with 
the profession of public accounting, might impair the image of the 
profession, or do not involve accounting or auditing related skills.
4. The existing limitations on MAS concerning independence con­
tained in the Professional Standards relating to Management Advisory 
Services (“MAS Professional Standards”), AICPA, Professional Stan­
dards, Vol. 1, MS §§ 101 et seq. and the Code of Professional Ethics, 
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET §§ 50 et seq.6 embrace 
several provisions that are helpful in ensuring that independence will 
be maintained. Compliance with those applicable provisions should 
be made a condition of membership in the SEC Practice Section and 
peer reviews should be required to test for compliance.
5. Amendments to Regulation 14A (the proxy rules) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and certain publicly available 
reports required of members of the SEC Practice Section will increase 
the amount of public disclosure concerning the nature and amount 
of MAS furnished by an auditor to an audit client and will reveal 
whether the client’s audit committee or board of directors have both 
approved the MAS and considered its possible effect on independence. 
To the extent that certain MAS may be perceived publicly as impair­
ing independence, the new disclosure rules, including the role of the 
audit committee or the board of directors, should either allay suspicion
6. See notes 145 and 159, infra, and accompanying text.
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or cause clients and auditors to alter their relationships. These dis­
closure provisions should be given a chance to work, and they should 
serve to provide a stronger data base for monitoring of this area.
The Board does, however, recommend that SEC Practice Section 
members be required to include in their annual disclosure statements 
filed with the SEC Practice Section disclosure of gross fees both for 
MAS and tax services performed for audit clients expressed as a per­
centage of aggregate fees charged during the reporting period.
6. In the Board’s view an accounting firm’s independence is not 
impaired solely because a person associated with the firm acts as an 
enrolled actuary for an employee benefit plan of an audit client or as 
an enrolled actuary for such a plan which is an audit client. The 
Board, however, believes that an accounting firm should not provide 
actuarial services for an insurance company audit client unless those 
services are supplemental to primary actuarial advice furnished by 
another actuary not associated with the accounting firm.
7. The Board accepts the recent action of the Executive Committee 
proscribing certain executive recruiting services inasmuch as the ser­
vices proscribed are perceived by others as having a strong likelihood 
of impairing independence, are available from other responsible 
sources, and do not otherwise produce sufficient countervailing bene­
fits. In general, however, the Board is reluctant to support prohibi­
tions against useful services which are based primarily on appearance 
without an adequate basis in fact.
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Background
One of the early public criticisms concerning the breadth of services 
furnished by public accountants was expressed in a survey and at­
tendant article published by Arthur A. Schulte, Jr. in 1965.7 Mr. 
Schulte’s study concluded that the profession should seriously con­
sider whether engaging in management consulting services for audit 
clients creates a conflict of interest and a concomitant lowering of 
public confidence in auditors’ reports.
In the few years immediately following Mr. Schulte’s article, 
several other interested persons conducted surveys and wrote articles 
addressing the question of whether auditors can appropriately per­
form MAS for their audit clients.8
In the fall of 1966, the AICPA formed an ad hoc committee to 
examine the question of scope of services and how those services 
bear on an auditor’s independence. In August 1968, an interim 
report of this ad hoc committee was exposed for public comment. 
This was followed by a Final Report published in December 1969.9
The 1969 Final Report concluded generally that there was no 
evidence that performing a wide variety of management advisory ser­
vices impairs independence in fact. The 1969 Final Report, however, 
did acknowledge that a significant minority is concerned that render­
ing management advisory services may impair independence, suggest­
ing that the profession should be sensitive to the possibility that the 
rendering of such services may affect the appearance of independ­
ence.10 Nevertheless, the 1969 Final Report did not recommend
7. A. Schulte, “Compatibility of Management Consulting and Auditing,” 
supra note 4. Mr. Schulte’s study was prompted by the publication by the 
AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics of Opinion No. 12, in which the 
Committee stated that “there is no ethical reason why a member or associate 
may not properly perform . . . management advisory services, and at the 
same time serve the same client as independent auditor.” AICPA, Committee 
on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 12, “Independence” (1963). In 1973 the 
AICPA codified all prior statements and opinions in the AICPA’s Code of 
Professional Ethics. The original Opinion No. 12 can be found, however, in 
Carey and Doherty, “The Concept of Independence— Review and Restate­
ment,” supra note 4, at 39-40.
8. E.g., A. Briloff, “Old Myths and New Realities in Accountancy,” supra 
note 4; J. Carey and W. Doherty, “The Concept of Independence— Review 
and Restatement,” supra note 4.
9. 1969 Final Report, supra note 4.
10. The AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics is reported to have stated
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proscribing the rendering of MAS.11 Rather, it concluded that the 
situations in which the appearance of lack of independence might be 
involved are countless and that each case should be considered on its 
own circumstances. Furthermore, the Committee on Management 
Services of the AICPA had then recently published three statements 
which attempted to guide the profession in its performance of MAS 
and better inform the public of the nature of such services.12 In turn, 
it was believed that the more informed the public was, the less likely 
it would be that it would perceive the rendering of such services as 
impairing independence.13
In 1974 the AICPA, through its Committee on Scope and Struc­
ture, published another study and analysis of the question of the 
appropriate scope of services for CPAs to perform.14 This study 
generally concluded that the benefits to society, the audit, and the 
client arising from public accountants furnishing MAS are signi­
ficant and that the threat that rendering such services may impair 
independence or the appearance of independence is not sufficiently 
great to warrant their proscription.
Another major review of this question was conducted by the Cohen 
Commission.15 Its examination of the scope of services question en-
that the appearance of the lack of independence might arise from relationships 
which “might be regarded by a reasonable observer, who had knowledge of 
all the facts, as those involving conflict of interest which might impair the 
objectivity of a member in expressing an opinion on the financial statements 
of an enterprise.” 1969 Final Report, supra note 4, at 53.
11. The 1969 Final Report did recommend that the profession give serious 
consideration to whether CPA firms should furnish so-called “peripheral man­
agement advisory services” such as plant layout, executive search, and psycho­
logical testing. While these services were not thought to affect independence, 
they were viewed by some as diluting the image of the profession. 1969 Final 
Report, supra note 4, at 55.
12. The three statements were “Tentative Description of the Nature of 
Management Advisory Services by Independent Accounting Firms,” AICPA, 
Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410; “Competence in Management Ad­
visory Services,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 420; and “Role 
in Management Advisory Services,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, 
MS § 430.
13. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 96; P. Titard, “Independence 
and MAS— Opinions of Financial Statements Users,” supra note 4. Accounting 
Series Release No. 250 (June 29, 1978) (“ASR 250”) discussed at pp. 42-44, 
infra, is a substantial step toward this end.
14. 1974 Final Report, supra note 4.
15. The Cohen Commission was formally titled The Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities. It was an independent commission formed by the AICPA 
in 1974 and chaired by the late Manuel F. Cohen. The Cohen Commission 
studied several aspects of the accounting profession and in 1978 published the 
Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4.
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compassed a review of the several articles and surveys which had been 
published, a study of lawsuits and other proceedings against auditors, 
and extensive discussions with working auditors, financial analysts, 
technical partners in accounting firms, and representatives in govern­
ment agencies.16 After this thorough review of available data, the 
Cohen Commission was not prepared to recommend proscribing 
specific services,17 but it did register concern that rendering MAS con­
tinued to appear to impair independence, at least to a significant 
minority of financial statement users.18 It suggested, therefore, that 
the profession increase its educational efforts directed toward users, 
with emphasis on internal controls utilized by accounting firms to 
prevent conflicts of interest. Moreover, it recommended that efforts 
be made to inform users of the nature of MAS rendered to clients and 
that audit clients be urged to disclose the nature of the various ser­
vices furnished by the auditors.19
While the AICPA, in its 1969 Final Report and in its 1974 Final 
Report, and the Cohen Commission acknowledged concern that 
various surveys have concluded that rendering MAS to audit clients 
seemed to impair independence, at least in appearance, both con­
cluded that broad proscriptions were not necessary.
Shortly after the formation of the Cohen Commission, the United 
States Senate, through its Committee on Governmental Affairs, Sub­
committee on Reports, Accounting and Management (“Metcalf Sub­
committee”), launched a broad-scale inquiry of the accounting pro­
fession which included a review of the nature of services furnished by 
accounting firms. The resulting Senate Staff Report, based on inform­
ation obtained from the AICPA and accounting firms, generally 
concluded that auditors created a conflict of interest if they furnished 
MAS to audit clients since furnishing MAS “necessarily involves the 
. . . firms in the business operations of their corporate clients.”20 For
16. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 93-94.
17. The Cohen Commission did recommend that accounting firms not engage 
in recruiting individuals who would be directly involved in questions of auditor 
selection, with the exception that accountants ought to be permitted to respond 
informally to requests to identify potential board members. The Cohen Com­
mission, however, did not recommend any restrictions on the ability of in­
dividual staff or partners of an accounting firm to seek employment with 
clients of their firm or from clients to hire personnel from their accounting 
firm for employment at any level. Ibid., at 101.
18. “Users” generally refers to investors, lenders, financial analysts, invest­
ment advisers, and others who rely on financial statements for making invest­
ment or credit decisions.
19. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 102-103.
20. Senate Staff Report, supra note 4, at 50. The Senate Staff Report actually 
focused its attention on the so-called “Big Eight” firms and concluded that a
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example, the Senate Staff Report concluded that an auditor, furnish­
ing market study services, which an audit client uses in deciding to 
market a new product, has a professional interest in the success of 
that product. Similarly, the report noted that an accounting firm 
has a professional interest in seeing an executive, whom it recruited 
or helped to recruit, perform well in his new position. Accordingly, 
the argument goes, the auditor is no longer independent, now having 
an interest in seeing all or a segment of the client’s business succeed.
In April, May, and June of 1977, the Metcalf Subcommittee con­
ducted hearings to address various issues that had been raised in the 
Senate Staff Report. The Metcalf Subcommittee issued a report in 
November 1977, based on an analysis of the Senate Staff Report, the 
record of its hearings, and other documentary m a t e r i a l s .21 This 
Senate Report covered a broad spectrum of subjects, including the 
question of scope of services.
The Senate Report noted that some witnesses testified that the 
furnishing of certain management advisory services by auditors to 
audit clients reflected adversely on the stated ideals of the profession 
and on independence and that accounting firms may be in a position 
to compete unfairly for business offered by other consultants.22 Ex­
pressing concern with this testimony, the Metcalf Subcommittee con­
cluded that accounting firms should perform for audit clients only 
services related to accounting.23 This would prohibit the furnishing of 
such services as “executive recruitment, marketing analysis, plant 
layout, product analysis, and actuarial services.”24 In addition, the 
Senate Report stated that all placement activities25 should be discon-
conflict would arise if such a firm furnished MAS to audit clients. In deter­
mining the existence or nonexistence of conflicts of interest which jeopardize 
independence, the Board perceives no basis for distinguishing the “Big Eight” 
from other accounting firms. Indeed, as discussed in note 36, infra, the smaller 
CPA firms seem not to want separate and more permissive treatment based 
upon their size or the size and nature of their clientele.
21. Senate Report, supra note 4.
22. While the Subcommittee generally agreed with the Cohen Commission’s 
Report of Tentative Conclusions issued in March 1977, it registered some dis­
agreement in the area of scope of services. The Board has not thought it 
appropriate to address the question of unequal competition.
23. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 17.
24. Ibid.
25. The phrase “placement activities” generally refers to the practice of 
assisting employees of the accounting firm in locating employment outside the 
firm, including employment with audit clients of the firm. The motivation, at 
least for the larger firms, to provide such placement services largely arises 
from the “leveraged” structure of those firms. Most young CPAs hired by 
these firms never become partners, and they know this. One reason able 
graduates accept such a competitive environment is the belief that, whether
10
tinued as well. The Metcalf Subcommittee indicated that the only 
management advisory services which it believed were appropriate 
were “providing certain computer and system analyses . . . necessary 
for improving internal control procedures of corporations.”26
In addition to the inquiry by the Metcalf Subcommittee, the Sub­
committee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Moss Subcommittee) has con­
ducted hearings related to the role of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in establishing accounting principles and overseeing 
the profession generally.27
The Congressional interest in the profession, as evidenced by the 
work of the Metcalf Subcommittee and the Moss Subcommittee, 
prompted the accounting profession to undertake a program of in­
creased self-regulation. At its annual meeting in September 1977, 
the AICPA approved a comprehensive plan which involved the 
establishment of a Division for CPA Firms of the AICPA and two 
sections of that Division—the SEC Practice Section and the Private 
Companies Practice Section.28 In addition, the Public Oversight 
Board was established to conduct continuing oversight of all activities 
of the SEC Practice Section.
The scope of services question under review by the Board arises in 
the context of the standards for eligibility to become a member of, or 
retain membership in, the SEC Practice Section. A document en­
titled “Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms” (Organization 
Document) sets forth the objectives of the SEC Practice Section, the 
membership eligibility criteria, structure of various operating com­
mittees and governing bodies, the functions of the Public Oversight 
Board, peer review information, and other matters.
As initially approved by the Executive Committee of the SEC Prac­
tice Section, the Organization Document provides that members of 
that Section should refrain from providing MAS to audit clients who 
are SEC reporting companies where providing such services would
or not they want to become partners or fail to be invited, they will have 
attractive alternative career opportunities.
26. Senate Report, supra note 4, at 17.
27. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess., Reform and Self-Regulation Efforts of the Accounting 
Profession (Committee Print 1978).
28. Members of the AICPA are individuals, not firms. The significance of 
the new division was to provide a facility for some form of self-regulatory 
controls over firms. Participation in either section, of course, is voluntary and 
is achieved by submitting an application and agreeing, among other things, to 
abide by all of the requirements for section membership.
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impair independence or where such services are predominantly com­
mercial in character, inconsistent with the firm’s professional status 
as certified public accountants, and inconsistent with the firm’s re­
sponsibilities to the public. The Organization Document also states 
that, in determining which MAS to perform, primary emphasis 
should be placed on “accounting and financial related areas.” Psycho­
logical testing, conducting public opinion polls, and merger and acqui­
sition work for a finder’s fee are expressly prohibited. Additional pro­
scriptions and guidance are contained in Appendices A and B to the 
Organization Document. Appendix A addresses two specific services 
—marketing consulting and plant layout.29 Effective July 26, 1978, 
the Executive Committee approved adding Appendix B, which em­
bodies limitations on performing executive search services.30 The 
text of the existing scope limitations contained in the Organization 
Document appears in Addendum A to this report.
While the scope of services membership criteria remains as described 
above and as reflected in Addendum A hereto, on May 8, 1978, the 
Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section tentatively ap­
proved certain changes in those criteria, subject to obtaining the views 
of the Board on this subject.31
As proposed to be revised, the membership eligibility criteria re­
lating to scope of services would prohibit members of the SEC Prac­
tice Section from furnishing services to audit clients who are SEC 
reporting companies when such services (1) impair the firm’s indepen­
dence in expressing an opinion on financial statements of that client 
or (2) require skills not related to accounting or auditing. The details 
of these criteria, including a discussion of specific services which do 
and do not satisfy the criteria, are embodied in proposed Appendix A 
to the Organization Document. The proposed amendment to that 
Document and the proposed new Appendix A thereto appear as Ad­
dendum B to this report and are discussed in the Notice.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also expressed views 
on this subject. In Securities Act Release No. 5869 (September 26, 
1977), the Commission solicited public comment on proposals calling 
for disclosure in proxy statements of audit and other fees incurred by 
the registrant during the year and also asked for comment on several 
questions relating to restricting the scope of services accountants can 
perform for audit clients.
29. See pp. 46-48 infra.
30. See pp. 53-54 infra.
31. As indicated above, at its meeting on July 26, 1978, the Executive Com­
mittee approved that portion of the proposal relating to executive recruiting 
services.
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In June 1978, ASR 25032 was released, announcing amendments 
to certain rules requiring disclosure in proxy statements of the various 
services furnished by a registrant’s auditor during the year, the per­
centage relationship the aggregate fee for all nonaudit services bears 
to the audit fee, and the percentage relationship each nonaudit service 
(describing the service if more than 3 percent) bears to the audit 
fee.33 In ASR 250 the Commission indicated that it had not yet 
determined to propose rules limiting the scope of services but would 
await the conclusions and recommendations of the Board. The Board 
understands that some people react to SEC disclosure requirements 
as though the matters to be disclosed somehow represent unlawful or 
improper business practices. Such a reaction may unnecessarily result 
in a loss of some MAS advice for audit clients.
The Commission again addressed the scope of services question in 
a Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Account­
ing Profession and the Commission’s Oversight Role, dated July 1, 
1978.34 In that report the Commission cited three basic questions to 
be resolved: (1) whether fees from management advisory services 
could be so large as to affect the accountant’s objectivity in conducting 
the audit; (2) whether certain services are so unrelated to the normal 
experience of auditors that it is inconsistent with the concept of 
being an accounting or auditing professional to perform those services; 
and (3) whether certain services are so closely linked to the account­
ing function that performing them will, in the course of an audit, 
place the auditor in the position of reviewing his own work. The Com­
mission again noted that the Board was reviewing this matter and 
that it would await the Board’s views before deciding to take any 
action.
32. See note 13, supra.
33. The rule changes announced in ASR 250 also require registrants to dis­
close whether the audit committee or board of directors approved each pro­
fessional service furnished by the principal accountant and considered the 
possible effect on independence and whether such approval and consideration 
was given before or after the service was provided.
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 25 (November 2, 1978) the Commission’s 
staff advised that it would be acceptable to state that there was advance 
approval of services where board of directors or audit committee approves 
a generic category of services, at least annually, and where such approval 
includes a limitation regarding the magnitude of the services and a subsequent 
review to compare the services rendered with such approval.
Of course, an unanticipated occasion for a particular MAS service might 
arise between meetings of the audit committee or board. There are several 
reasonable ways to handle such an occurrence, the disclosure of which should 
cause no embarrassment to the client or the CPA firm.
34. SEC Report to Congress, supra note 4.
13
Discussion of Scope Limitations
Approach to Problem
As is indicated by the extensive record, including the formal record 
of the Board’s proceedings and other documentary material concern­
ing this matter, the limitations on the types of services auditors should 
furnish to audit clients have been studied intensely. It is apparent 
that these continuing studies have produced very few conclusions 
which constitute a consensus. Perhaps the only conclusion everyone, 
or almost everyone, agrees with is that rendering some manage­
ment advisory services to audit clients is perceived by some persons 
as creating a situation in which an auditor’s independence could be 
impaired.35 There also seems to be some consensus, however, that 
some services are not appropriately performed by certified public 
accountants because they derogate the professional image which is 
important to maintain.36 Going from these two broad findings to 
specific examples of which services should and which should not 
be prohibited is no easy task.
In the analysis which follows, the Board has avoided discussing 
specific services, except in certain instances. Rather, the Board has 
focused its analysis on the general criteria employed by the Executive 
Committee of the SEC Practice Section in the Organization Document 
and in the proposed revisions to it.
The Board believes that persons should not be prohibited from 
engaging in lawful and perhaps beneficial activity unless it is demon­
strated that the prohibition serves some necessary purpose and is 
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose. Thus, where measures 
less draconian than outright prohibition are available they should be
35. POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 10; 
C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 34; R. Keating, A. S. Hansen, 
Inc., Tr. 94; E. Boynton, American Academy of Actuaries, Tr. 104, 111; C. 
Watson, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, Tr. 123-28; R. Cardinal, 
Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc., Tr. 139-43; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin 
and Glasser, Tr. 227; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 243-44; 
A. B. Frechtman, Robert Half Personnel Agencies, Tr. 340-41.
36. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 
7, 20-21; W. Mueller, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 12; P. Arnstein, John F. 
Forbes & Co., Tr. 47-50; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 245-47; 
J. Korreck, Illinois CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 285-86; J. Burton, 
Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 313, 317.
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employed and resort to prohibitions utilized only after such other 
measures fail.
The Board also believes it is important to bear in mind that impos­
ing limitations on the scope of services public accountants can per­
missibly perform will not only affect the large accounting firms, 
which could probably survive and prosper under whatever rules are 
adopted, but will also affect management advisory practitioners within 
those firms and small accounting firms and their clients who rely 
heavily on a variety of advisory-type services.37
Finally, the Board believes it is important to recognize that MAS 
is not a recent and subversive corruption of the pristine role of the 
CPA firm as “pure” auditor. History actually has gone the other way, 
and modem CPA firms as auditors are perhaps more “pure” than 
they have ever been. From a historical perspective, accountancy 
has been professionalized largely through the enactment of statutes 
encouraging or requiring audits and financial disclosures. For ex­
ample, the Federal Reserve Board, created by the Federal Reserve 
Act of 1913, encouraged business entities to supply certified financial 
statements when seeking to obtain bank notes issued against com­
mercial paper. More importantly, the federal securities legislation 
enacted in 1933 and 1934 made accountants essential to corporations 
required to comply with the financial disclosure laws. This federal 
legislation formalized the accountant’s public responsibilities and gave 
the profession statutory recognition.
Nevertheless, the accounting profession has never been based solely
37. While any proscription emanating from the SEC Practice Section can only 
be imposed directly against members of that Section, the testimony at the 
hearings quite clearly demonstrated that virtually all accounting firms would 
feel constrained to abide by them. This is particularly true if any proscription 
were founded on the claim that an accounting firm providing such a service to 
an audit client would not be independent for purposes of expressing an opinion 
on that client’s financial statements.
The importance of maintaining independence is so well grounded in auditing 
literature and codes of ethics that establishing variations on that theme does not 
seem to be a reasonable solution. Accordingly, any decision in this area cannot 
nicely be confined to the so-called “Big Eight,” which was the focus of the Sen­
ate Report, and other large accounting firms. Spokesmen for smaller account­
ing firms were especially vehement in opposing the creation of any “second 
class” membership that looked toward allowing them to be less independent or 
to appear to be less independent or less “professional” just because they were 
small. The Board respects this attitude, so strongly felt and stated, even though 
some of the controversy in this area might be resolved by doing that very thing.
POB Hearing Testimony: J. Mason, Jr., The University of Alabama, Tr. 
211; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser, Tr. 222-23; S. Klion, Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 250; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Com­
mittee, Tr. 270; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Com­
mittee, Tr. 301-04; H. Bernstein, Bernstein and Bank, Ltd., Tr. 359, 362.
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on auditing skills. Those who formed the American Association of 
Public Accountants in 1887 (renamed the American Institute of 
Accountants in 1917 and in 1956, after a merger in 1936 with 
the American Society of Certified Public Accountants, renamed the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) were rendering 
a variety of services including bookkeeping and management advice, 
and were not engaged primarily in auditing.
The first Revenue Act of 1913, authorized by the Sixteenth Amend­
ment, also created a boom for accountants capable of handling the new 
income tax laws. Most small businessmen suddenly needed expert 
assistance to install bookkeeping systems, prepare financial statements 
and tax returns, and handle disputes with revenue agents. Since the 
first statutes were passed, accountants have been integrally involved 
in furnishing a wide variety of tax advisory services.
Accountants also have long engaged in giving management advice 
to clients, and, during the last 30 to 35 years, beginning with the 
advent of World War II, accountants have enjoyed a rapid growth 
in new forms of MAS. This growth in part has been the result of 
general postwar corporate growth and the application of new tech­
niques and systems approaches to problems developed during the 
war which were well suited to accountants.38
Benefits of MAS
While the rendering of management advisory services has been at­
tacked from many directions, it has also been praised by credible 
sources. Many persons speaking before and submitting written state­
ments to the Board, along with periodical literature, comments sub­
mitted to the SEC, and several predecessors to this task of exploring 
MAS, have illuminated the many benefits that MAS can provide for 
audit clients. Even if MAS could arguably be said to taint an auditor’s 
appearance of independence, it cannot be denied that much of value 
is also produced.
First, from a client’s viewpoint, an accounting firm that has con­
ducted an extensive and competent audit is a logical choice when that 
client needs management advice. Assuming that the accounting firm
38. For detailed discussions of the growth of accountancy and its many com­
ponents in both America and Great Britain see J. Carey, The CPA Plans for the 
Future (1965); J. Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession (2 vols. 1969 & 
1970); A. Littleton, Accounting Evolution to 1900 (1933); A. Littleton, Essays 
on Accountancy (1961); S. Zeff, Forging Accounting Principles in Five Coun­
tries: A History and Analysis of Trends (University of Edinburgh Accounting 
Lectures (1971)); Studies in the History of Accounting (A. Littleton & B. 
Young, eds. (1956)).
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has the competence to render the services needed, its audit clients 
will naturally want to take advantage of its knowledge, experience, 
organization, and personnel. Each job may begin more quickly and 
proceed more efficiently than if the client had to engage a different 
firm.39 For many smaller businesses, a requirement to retain separate 
accounting firms or other consultants for MAS and audit services 
might be cost prohibitive, and might obviously result in a sacrifice of 
one or the other, or at least a decrease in the quality of services a 
company could afford. Because all concerned parties advocate im­
proving accounting services for the benefit of businesses and the pub­
lic, such pressures may be counterproductive. At the very least, the 
cost savings and quality improvements created by allowing account­
ants to provide MAS to audit clients are real benefits that must be 
seriously considered.
Second, many persons appearing before the Board asserted that 
MAS capabilities within a firm and an audit team enhance audit 
quality.40 Audits are improved, it is argued, because a firm with 
professionals experienced in MAS has more sophistication in the 
increasingly complex and intricate inner workings of business enter­
prises. With that broader base of experience and knowledge of a 
client’s business such a firm can more effectively conduct an in-depth 
audit through more responsible inquiries and evaluations.41
39. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 76- 
77; POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 28; 
H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser, Tr. 224; H. Bernstein, Bernstein 
and Bank, Ltd., Tr. 360. Letters from: Donald E. Schowengerdt, July 28, 
1978; and AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, August 7, 1978, in response to 
the Notice.
40. POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 28; 
J. Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 198-99; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and 
Glasser, Tr. 225-26; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 238-39; M. 
Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 268-69; J. Korreck, Illinois 
CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 284; L. Dowell, McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn 
& Company, Tr. 290-91; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 
306; H. Bernstein, Bernstein & Bank, Ltd., Tr. 363. Letters in response to the 
Notice from: Eisner & Lubin, July 18, 1978; McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & 
Company, July 31, 1978; and Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, August 7, 
1978. Response to Securities Act Release No. 5869: Coopers & Lybrand; 
Touche Ross & Co. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra 
note 4, at 74-76.
41. In a comment letter submitted before the POB Hearing, John C. Burton, 
Columbia Graduate School of Business, and former Chief Accountant of the 
SEC, explained some of his own experiences which illustrate the benefits of 
MAS in the audit process. In his own words he states:
When I was a staff accountant, one of my clients asked our firm to develop a 
system for translating foreign currency statements in U.S. dollar statements for 
consolidation purposes. I and a consultant worked on the job and developed an
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As appealing as this argument is, there were some differences of 
opinion at the POB hearings as to how this goal of improved audits 
is attained. Some testified that persons experienced in MAS are 
utilized in almost every audit and thus provide a broader knowledge 
to the audit team.42 Others asserted that MAS professionals, although 
not assigned to each audit team, are frequently consulted and available 
to auditors.43 Still others explained that members of MAS units and 
audit divisions often switch from one to another, carrying with them 
certain expertise that is naturally incorporated into both areas.4 
Despite this rather hazy picture that was drawn at the hearings regard­
ing the precise mechanics of incorporating MAS capabilities into 
audits, all witnesses discussing this subject fervently maintained that 
performing MAS led to an improvement in audit quality.45 To foster
understanding in depth of the translation process which would not have occurred 
otherwise, and in a subsequent audit I was able to point to certain implications of 
particular changes in exchange rates on the client’s statements which required 
careful audit consideration.
In a second case, I as a professor was consulting with an accounting firm in the 
area of management services research. One of my areas of interest was credit 
policy, and the firm was given an engagement to study the credit policy of one 
of its large mail order clients who wished to develop an improved system of credit 
control. I worked on the engagement with a consultant from the firm’s manage­
ment services staff and an audit manager. We assisted in the development of a 
credit policy and a system of credit control, and in so doing achieved an under­
standing of the variables affecting credit loss for that firm that could never have 
been achieved through normal auditing techniques. This understanding was of 
great importance to the audit staff in evaluating the adequacy of the client’s allow­
ance for uncollectible accounts. In the year prior to the consulting engagement, 
the client’s allowance was materially understated in the financial statements and 
its income was materially overstated, even though procedures were performed. 
In the year following the engagement, the audit staff, assisted by workpapers from 
the consulting engagement, were able to appraise the adequacy of the allowance 
with far greater accuracy.
For other examples see Letters in response to the Notice from: Laventhol & 
Horwath, August 8, 1978; and Coopers & Lybrand, August 10, 1978.
42. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: S. Klion, AICPA, MAS Executive Com­
mittee Chairman, Tr. 275-76. See also Response to Securities Act Release No. 
5869: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Exhibit II.
43. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser, 
Tr. 230-33; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee, 
Tr. 302.
The Board urges the Executive Committee to consider what formal pro­
cedures, if any, accounting firms should be encouraged or required to institute 
in order to realize audit benefits from furnishing MAS, taking into account the 
need to maintain independence. E.g., the comments of S. Burton recited at 
note 129, supra.
44. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Com­
mittee, Tr. 272-73; S. Klion, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 276.
45. One response to critics who assert that MAS creates the potential for 
self-review is to isolate the MAS practitioners from the audit staff so that no 
individual will be reviewing his own work. Carried to its extreme, this sug-
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continued improvement the Board believes that accounting firms 
should apply their MAS expertise to the audit function to the fullest 
extent possible.
Another benefit of MAS appears to be the quality of young 
professionals who are attracted to accounting firms because of the 
opportunity to practice MAS. Time and again the Board heard 
testimony that the best and brightest students emerging from busi­
ness schools are most interested in firms that will afford them the 
opportunity to work in the MAS area.46 Whether these students event­
ually do practice MAS, or do so only for a while, the availability of 
broader experience beyond that of auditing makes some accounting 
firms more attractive. Because the audit function is highly important 
to the SEC Practice Section, given its critical function for reporting 
companies, the Board is sensitive to the needs of accounting firms that 
perform audits to strengthen their ranks with the brightest profes­
sionals available. Consequently, this benefit of MAS to the account­
ing profession and to the public, who must rely on the work product 
of these professional auditors, can also be considered an important 
one.
There are other advantages to allowing accountants to provide 
MAS to audit clients in addition to attracting bright students and 
enhancing audit quality. One is that an auditor who also has some 
responsibility for advising its client on internal financial controls can 
facilitate an audit by improving the underlying structure of what is 
audited.47 Auditors are naturally aware of deficiencies in informa­
tion systems. If they can work with a client to improve a system the 
result is twofold. First, future audits should be less costly because 
they will be more easily accomplished. Second, improved controls 
will in turn make financial statements more accurate and reliable be­
cause the system on which they are based is equally so. Thus, a great 
benefit can be seen in allowing an accounting firm to communicate 
to a client weaknesses and defects observed in an audit and also to
gestion results in a significant diminution of the benefit MAS may bring to an 
audit. As long as the MAS personnel abide by the existing standards requiring 
that they limit their role to that of advisers, the problem of self-review, in large 
measure, is solved.
46. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: J. Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 195; M. 
Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 268-69; J. Burton, Columbia 
Graduate School of Business, Tr. 306, 310. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are 
the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 76. Letter in response to the Notice from 
J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business.
47. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 75; 
POB Hearing Testimony: M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 
269. Letter in response to the Notice from McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & 
Company, July 31, 1978.
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be retained to make specific recommendations for improvements 
through its MAS services.48
Finally, there seems to be a general consensus that maintaining a 
competent accounting firm today does mandate a kind of knowledge 
broader than in the past.49 As the AICPA’s Committee on Scope and 
Structure reported, “a command of more than one field of knowledge 
is required if the profession is to be fully responsive to the growing 
public need for better and more extensive services.”50 The growing 
complexities within the profession are illustrated not only by the kinds 
of services that are in demand, but also by newly developing account­
ing principles and techniques. For example, new concerns with the 
effects of inflation and certain required disclosures of larger companies 
have caused accountants to deal with much more “soft” information 
than in the past. Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
recently called for the development and implementation of a method 
of accounting that provides for recognition in financial statements of 
proved oil and gas reserves as assets and of changes in proved oil and 
gas reserves in e a r n in g s .51 Whether this “reserve recognition account­
ing” is actually feasible remains uncertain, but the future task of work­
ing on its development is clearly going to be difficult, as recognized by 
the Commission, because traditional accounting methods do not ade­
quately provide for recognition of the discovery of oil and gas. The
48. Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, added to that Act by the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, creates an affirmative obligation on each issuer 
of securities, subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, to 
establish and maintain a system of internal controls sufficient to provide reason­
able assurances that certain stated standards are met. Accounting firms are 
already actively engaged in providing advice and assistance to audit clients in 
meeting these requirements which go well beyond matters of accounting and 
bookkeeping.
In this vein a partner of a major accounting firm recently made the follow­
ing observation:
To restrict [MAS] would be particularly shortsighted and unwise at this time be­
cause the SEC is virtually certain to demand in the near future that public com­
panies report on the quality of their internal controls.
W. Hanson, “Public Accountancy And The Domino Theory,” Mid-Hudson 
Business Journal, Harrison, New York (January 2, 1979).
49. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 
89-90; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 268-69; J. Korreck, 
Illinois CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 284; L. Dowell, McGladrey, Han­
sen, Dunn & Company, Tr. 290-91. Letter in response to the Notice from: 
AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, August 7, 1978; Touche, Ross & Co., 
August 17, 1978; Ralph E. Kent, August 7, 1978; and Donald E. Schowengerdt, 
July 28, 1978.
50. 1974 Final Report, supra note 4, at 24.
51. Accounting Series Release No. 253 (August 31, 1978).
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inherent imprecision of estimates of proved oil and gas reserves further 
guarantees that this new accounting for oil and gas production will 
require skills and expertise that many accountants do not now possess.52
Some or all of the several benefits mentioned above are present in 
the wide array of MAS being performed today. It is impossible, how­
ever, for the Board to measure, in the abstract, the precise benefit 
accruing from each possible service and concluding whether furnishing 
that service to audit clients should be permitted. In any event, the 
Board does not believe it is necessary at this time to engage in such 
abstract analysis. For one thing, the possible benefit is only one factor 
to consider. The others include the fact that impairment of inde­
pendence in fact has not been demonstrated and impairment of the 
appearance of independence can be cured with greater awareness.
SEC Practice Section— Existing and 
Proposed Scope Limitations
As indicated above, the Organization Document provides that a 
member of the SEC Practice Section may not perform services for 
audit clients that will impair that member’s independence and that 
primary emphasis should be on services which are in accounting and 
financial related areas. The Proposal embraces the independence 
criteria and adds to it the requirement that the services require skills 
related to auditing and accounting. The Board understands that the 
“accounting and financial related areas” standard and the “auditing 
and accounting skills” proposed standard both are designed generally 
to proscribe services which may be incompatible with accounting or 
which may tarnish the profession’s image.
Although notions of compatibility or image have been discussed 
for many years, until incorporated in the standards for membership 
in the SEC Practice Section, very few attempts had been made to 
identify the class of activity which might impinge on them. Inde­
pendence, on the other hand, has been a concept with which the pro­
fession has had to live for many years and which has resulted in 
numerous interpretations both by the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission and the AICPA. The requirement that accountants be in­
dependent of their clients when issuing opinions on financial state-
52. The new demands on the accounting profession have also been recognized 
by the United States General Accounting Office, in which over 50 percent of the 
professional staff have basic skills in areas other than accounting. W. Dreher 
and C. Graese, “The Compatibility of Actuarial Consulting and Auditing 
Services,” supra note 4, at 38. See also letter in response to the Notice from 
Ralph E. Kent, August 7, 1978.
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ments is embodied in the AICPA’s Code of Professional E t h i c s , 53 and 
the requirement extends to rendering reports on financial statements to 
any client of the accountant, whether or not that client is subject to 
the reporting requirements of the federal securities laws. There is no 
question, therefore, that an accountant, in deciding whether to per­
form a particular service for an audit client, must determine whether 
performing that service will impair his independence with respect to 
the audit.
The compatibility or image criterion contained in the Organization 
Document—whether stated as services which are in financial or ac­
counting areas or which require skills related to auditing or account­
ing—poses a more difficult question for the Board because it remains 
unresolved by the profession and the SEC. It is necessary to ask 
whether that criterion serves any necessary or useful purpose and 
whether it is susceptible of sufficiently definite articulation to make it 
meaningful. As indicated in the Conclusions and Recommendations 
section, the Board believes that the compatibility criterion should not 
be imposed, at least at this time.
Compatibility or Image Criterion
A substantial number of persons testifying at the Board’s hearings and 
submitting written comments in response to the Notice criticized the 
audit and accounting skill related criterion embodied in the Proposal. 
Some witnesses argued that the only relevant criterion is independence, 
urging complete elimination of the skill related criterion or any similar 
types of criteria, such as accounting and financial related areas pre­
sently contained in the Organization Document.54 Others urged that 
some criteria limiting services to areas compatible with accounting or 
to auditing and accounting related areas be employed as an alternative 
to skill related criteria.55
Witnesses and commentators who favored some compatibility cri­
teria, but not those based on skills, were concerned primarily that the 
skill criteria would be virtually useless, being susceptible of permitting
53. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 50 et seq.
54. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 73; 
H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 171, 175; J. Mason, Jr., The Uni­
versity of Alabama, Tr. 205; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, 
Tr. 270; J. Korreck, Illinois CPA Society, MAS Committee, Tr. 283; S. Hebert, 
North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee, Tr. 296.
55. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 6-9, 
18-20; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 244-51; J. Burton, 
Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 313.
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nearly any type of service, depending on one’s interpretation.56 A 
broad interpretation could effectively reduce the purported limitation 
to a meaningless obstacle and a poorly veiled subterfuge. Some wit­
nesses, however, suggested that a limitation couched in terms of audit­
ing and accounting related areas, as opposed to skills, would be less 
susceptible of a broad interpretation and would more effectively limit 
services to those which are compatible with auditing or accounting.57 
The desire to achieve compatibility was alternatively expressed as a 
desire to preserve the accountants’ image or dignity as professionals.58
Witnesses and commentators opposed to any criteria, save inde­
pendence, believed that the skill related criterion embodied in the 
Proposal was illogical and wholly unrelated to the quality of audits.59 
If the standard is to improve an accountant’s image or prevent the de­
terioration of that image, it will be ineffectual if applied only to serv­
ices rendered to audit clients who are SEC reporting companies. From 
the standpoint of image the danger exists that accountants might ap­
pear to have converted a professional practice into a commercial en­
terprise. The appearance of commercialism relates to the types of serv­
ices performed, not the nature of the person for whom they are per­
formed. This, of course, is in sharp contrast to the concerns related 
to independence.
In sum, there was significant support for the conclusions that a skill 
related criterion was unnecessary because it was unrelated to the 
quality of audits, was unworkable and meaningless because it was sus­
ceptible of any convenient interpretation, and was an inappropriate 
and ineffectual gesture to assuage political critics who would not be 
satisfied in any event.
The Board agrees with those witnesses who have urged that any 
limitation on services be predicated only on the requirement that serv­
ices not be furnished to audit clients if furnishing such services would 
impair the accountant’s independence in rendering an opinion on that 
client’s financial statements. Nevertheless, the Board is sympathetic
56. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 7, 
18-19; Letter in response to the Notice from A.M, Pullen & Co., August 2, 1978.
57. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 7, 
20; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 313.
58. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: P. Arnstein, John F. Forbes & Company, 
Tr. 54; R. Mautz, Ernst & Ernst, Tr. 152, 161; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell & Co., Tr. 245.
59. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 
28-30; N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 73-74; R. Mautz, Ernst & Ernst, 
Tr. 153; H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 171, 175; J. Mason, Jr., The 
University of Alabama, Tr. 205; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 
237; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee, Tr. 296.
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with those who expressed some concern with respect to image or com­
patibility. The Board views compatibility as a limitation which would 
enhance image but not necessarily to the exclusion of other limitations. 
Accordingly, the Board has chosen to discuss the subject in terms of 
image.
The early studies and analyses of scope of services recognized a dis­
tinction between those services which seemingly impaired the appear­
ance of independence and those services which arguably impaired 
image.60 In fact, services which raise image questions are, as a general 
matter, so unrelated to what is generally thought to be an accountant’s 
role, that concern for maintaining independence is hardly an issue.61 
The converse is also true. Services most related to accounting and 
auditing and auditing generally seem to be those services which may 
impair independence or the appearance of independence.62
60. In its 1969 Final Report, the Ad Hoc Committee made the following 
observation:
Services which apear unrelated to the accounting function, in its broadest sense, 
have been singled out for criticism. The committee believes that the critics are 
not so much concerned about their relation to audit independence . . .  as their 
seeming incongruity with traditional accounting practice.
1969 Final Report, supra note 4, at 54. But see Hartley and Ross, “MAS and 
Audit Independence: An Image Problem,” supra note 4, whose survey suggests 
that there is a significant correlation from a perception standpoint between 
services which could impair independence and those which are incompatible 
with the image of an accountant.
61. This does not mean that the performance of services wholly unrelated to 
accounting or auditing could never pose independence problems. Certainly if, 
on a continuing basis, the magnitude, in terms of revenue of such unrelated 
services to any one client, became very large in relation to the audit services, 
serious questions would be raised with respect to independence. The Board is 
not prepared to speculate as to the point at which the relationship between audit 
and nonaudit fees poses such a problem. But, based on existing data concerning 
fee relationships, the Board is satisfied that that point has not been reached on a 
broad and continuing scale. See note 65, infra. More will be known on this 
subject as 1979 proxy statements containing the information called for by 
ASR 250 become available.
62. Letter in response to the Notice from J. Burton, Columbia University 
Graduate School of Business, August 2, 1978.
This is also apparent from two of the three general questions posited by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the SEC Report to Congress. The two 
questions were stated as follows:
Are there some services which are so unrelated to the normal expertise and experi­
ence of auditors that it is inconsistent with the concept of being an auditing profes­
sional for auditors to perform those services?
Are there, conversely, some services so closely linked to the accounting function 
that, for the auditor to perform those services for his client means that, the auditor 
will, in conducting the audit, be in a position of reviewing his own work?
SEC Report to Congress, supra note 4, at 12.
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The Board recognizes that professional image is important to main­
tain since it can bear on the public’s confidence in financial state­
ments.63 And, maintaining such confidence is one of the primary rea­
sons for requiring that auditors be independent of their clients.64 The 
Board is concerned that accounting firms may tarnish their image as 
professional organizations if they appear ready, willing, and able to 
hawk any service for a profit.
The potential impairment to image, would, in the Board’s view, 
result from a dilution or perceived dilution of an accounting firm’s pri­
mary service—auditing and accounting. This dilution can manifest 
itself in terms of the number and types of nonaccounting or nonaudit­
ing services which are offered or in the amount of total revenues 
derived from such other services in relation to revenues from auditing 
and accounting services.65
While the Board is concerned with the possibility that broad-scale 
expansion by accounting firms into new areas may impair the profes­
sion’s image, it does not believe that the nature and extent of manage­
ment advisory services generally furnished in today’s environment war­
rant anything more than sounding an alarm.66 If the problem were
63. The concern is not related to competence, as some have apparently be­
lieved. An accounting firm can train or hire competent people as well as any 
other organization or group of people, and, under current Professional Standards 
relating to MAS, practitioners must have, before undertaking an engagement, 
“competence in the analytical approach and process, and in the technical sub­
ject matter under consideration.” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, 
MS § 120.
The concern also is not related to independence. If it were, the standard 
would be redundant since the AICPA’s Professional Code of Ethics and the 
membership criteria relating to independence already have established the 
required restriction.
64. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 110.03.
65. The SEC has suggested that aggregate MAS fees from an audit client, by 
their very size relative to the audit fee, may tend to corrupt—presumably the 
CPA firm will be motivated to be “friendly” in its auditing in order to retain 
the MAS revenues. See note 62, supra. At the Board’s hearing, each CPA 
witness who Was asked denied the cogency of this argument, citing the fact that 
all larger firms, at least, are dominated by audit-oriented CPAs and will con­
tinue to be; that aggregate CPA firm revenues from MAS, at least for the larger 
firms, are significantly less than audit revenues; and that, in any event, the 
exposure to money damages and worse from poor audits make it folly to 
compromise an audit to get or buy MAS business, and all members of the 
SEC Practice Section realize this. The Board tends to agree in theory with the 
SEC but accepts the practical response of the CPA witnesses, at least in present 
circumstances. Under present disclosure requirements of the SEC Practice 
Section and the SEC, if the relative proportions change, that fact will be easily 
observable.
66. The Board does not believe that the scope and extent of management ad-
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susceptible of rulemaking in a manner which was meaningful but 
which did not impede normal and proper growth in the dynamic area 
of auditing, the Board might be more inclined to agree with a rulemak­
ing approach, specifying acceptable and unacceptable MAS. For the 
time being the Board believes the profession should recognize the po­
tential problem and individual firms should exercise self-restraint and 
not venture into new areas of MAS which may impinge on their pro­
fessional image. This is perhaps even more true with respect to the 
larger and medium-sized accounting firms that have a public visibility 
through their auditing of publicly-held corporations.
The Board is also mindful that the marketplace should serve as a 
self-correcting device insofar as image is concerned. If furnishing a 
wide array of services does tarnish a particular firm’s professional 
standing, that should result in audit clients looking elsewhere for their 
needed auditing services. With the increased disclosure occasioned 
by ASR 250 and the requirement that members of the SEC Practice 
Section file annually with the Section a disclosure statement, includ­
ing disclosure of gross fees for all services—accounting and auditing, 
tax, and management advisory services67—expressed as a percentage 
of total gross fees, public awareness should play a larger role in shaping 
the scope of services accounting firms are willing to furnish.
Independence
Stated standards on independence
Independence has traditionally been defined by the profession as the 
ability to act with integrity and objectivity. Integrity is equivalent to 
honesty or to trustworthiness and incorruptibility even in the face of 
strong pressure. Objectivity has been described as the “lack of bias 
and resistance to any conscious or subconscious influence toward ac­
tion, inaction, conclusions or statements that are based on anything 
other than an impartial evaluation of the best available evidence.”68
visory services performed at present suggests any dilution of accounting firms’ 
primary service. The record indicates that management advisory services repre­
sent a small percentage of total revenues. Information submitted by the “Big 
Eight” firms to the Metcalf Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Manage­
ment, January, 1976, revealed that MAS, both to audit clients and nonaudit 
clients, generated from 5 to 16 percent of these firms’ total revenues. In letters 
submitted in response to Securities Act Release No. 5869 (September 26, 1977), 
these same firms reported percentage revenues ranging from 5 to 19 percent, 
and some smaller firms reported that MAS comprised 3.54 to 11 percent of total 
revenues. With additional public disclosure, discussed on page 44, this will be an 
item easy to monitor on an ongoing basis.
67. Organization Document, Section IV, 3, (g)(12). See pp. 43-44, infra, for 
additional disclosure recommended by the Board.
68. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 77.
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While it is, of course, essential that an auditor preserve his objectivity 
and integrity from his own viewpoint, commonly called “independence 
in fact,” it is also important that the auditor appear independent to all 
users of the financial information he provides. This latter concept is a 
key ingredient to the value of the audit function, since users of audit 
reports must be able to rely on the independent auditor. If they per­
ceive that there is a lack of independence, whether or not such a de­
ficiency exists, much of that value is lost.69
As the Auditing Standards Executive Committee of the AICPA 
has explained:
It is of utmost importance to the profession that the general public 
maintain confidence in the independence of independent auditors. Pub­
lic confidence would be impaired by evidence that independence was 
actually lacking, and it might also be impaired by the existence of cir­
cumstances which reasonable people might believe likely to influence 
independence. To be independent, the auditor must be intellectually 
honest; to be recognized as independent, he must be free from any ob­
ligation to or interest in the client, its management, or its owners. 
For example, an independent auditor auditing a company of which he 
was also a director might be intellectually honest, but it is unlikely that 
the public would accept him as independent since he would be in effect 
auditing decisions which he had a part in making. Likewise, an auditor 
with a substantial financial interest in a company might be unbiased 
in expressing his opinion on the financial statements of the company, 
but the public would be reluctant to believe that he was unbiased. In­
dependent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they should 
avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence.70
To prevent a public perception of a lack of independence, the ac­
counting profession has endeavored to prohibit an accountant from 
expressing an opinion on financial statements when certain relation­
ships exist between auditor and client. According to the AICPA’s 
Professional Standards, an auditor’s integrity and objectivity may be, 
or may appear to be, threatened by the existence of “(1) certain finan­
cial relationships with clients and (2) relationships in which a CPA is 
virtually part of management or an employee under management’s 
control.”71 As a general matter, only the latter relationship is relevant 
to the scope of services issue.72
69. A. Arens and J. Loebbecke, Auditing: An Integrated Approach (Prentice- 
Hall, 1976).
70. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 220.03.
71. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.10.
72. Both the existing and proposed scope limitations contained, and proposed 
to be contained, in the Organization Document prohibit engaging in MAS on a 
contingent fee basis. This is a sound restriction and shoud be retained. Other-
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There are three major rules promulgated by the AICPA that pro­
vide the framework for the independence requirement. First, the sec­
ond general auditing standard states that: “In all matters relating to 
the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be main­
tained by the auditor or a u d i t o r s . "73 Second, the Concepts of Profes­
sional Ethics contains the following statement: “A certified public ac­
countant should maintain his integrity and objectivity and, when 
engaged in the practice of public accounting, be independent of those 
he serves.”74 Third, Rule 101 of the Rules of Conduct provides spe­
cific instances of compromised independence.75 The AICPA’s Pro­
fessional Ethics Division and Management Advisory Services Division 
have also issued pronouncements regarding the relationships between 
management advisory services and independence.76
The AICPA can expel from the organization any member who is 
found to have violated its Rules of Conduct. Although such a con­
sequence would be a “weighty social and economic sanction,” expul­
sion from the AICPA does not prevent an accountant from practicing 
his profession.7 Each state controls accountants in public practice
wise, the accounting firm would, in the Board’s view, have a financial relation­
ship with the client which would impair its independence. A prohibition on 
contingent fees also is part of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Ethics, 
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 302.
73. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 220.01. The membership 
of the AICPA has officially adopted ten broad statements collectively entitled 
“Generally Accepted Auditing Standards.’’ These auditing standards deal with 
measures of the quality of the performance of auditing procedures and the ob­
jectives to be attained by the use of the procedures undertaken.
74. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52. The Concepts of Pro­
fessional Ethics is a philosophical essay approved by the professional ethics divi­
sion of the AICPA. The essay suggests behavior which CPAs should strive for 
beyond the minimum level of acceptable conduct set forth in the Rules of Con­
duct, infra note 75, and is not intended to establish enforceable standards.
75. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.01. The Rules of Con­
duct consists of enforceable ethical standards and requires the approval of the 
membership of the AICPA before the Rules become effective.
76. Pronouncements of the Management Advisory Services Division are “Man­
agement Advisory Services Practice Standard No. 1— Personal Characteristics,” 
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 110; “Tentative Description of 
the Nature of Management Advisory Services by Independent Accounting 
Firms,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410; and “Role in Man­
agement Advisory Services,” AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430. 
Pronouncements of the Professional Ethics Division are Interpretation No. 3 of 
Rule 101 of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics, AICPA, Professional 
Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.04; and various ethics rulings on independence, 
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 191.
77. A. Arens and J. Loebbecke, Auditing: 
note 4, at 33.
An Integrated Approach, supra
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within its borders by a licensing procedure and, thus, only a state 
board can prevent an accountant from practicing by revoking his 
license. Because all state boards have rules of conduct substantially 
similar to the AICPA’s, an accountant could be removed from public 
practice for failure to maintain independence during an audit, al­
though this happens infrequently.78
The Securities and Exchange Commission has also addressed the 
question of independence on sundry occasions over the years. In order 
to ensure public confidence in the objective reporting of financial in­
formation, certain rules, particularly Rule 2-0179 of Regulation S-X 
and Rule 2(e)80 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice were adopted. 
Generally, Regulation S-X requires that any audited financial state­
ments filed with the Commission be audited by an accountant who 
satisfies the independence requirements contained in that Regulation. 
Under Rule 2(e) the Commission may deny, temporarily or per­
manently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way 
to any person who is found by the Commission to have, among other 
things, engaged in any violation of the federal securities laws or the 
rules of the Commission, including its rules relating to independence 
contained in Regulation S-X.81
The Commission has consistently held that the question of in­
dependence is to be determined in light of all the pertinent circum­
stances in a particular case.82 Rule 2-01(b) of Regulation S-X, 
however, does set forth certain specific relationships and circum­
stances which are so likely to impair independence that the Com­
mission will refuse to recognize as independent any accountant having 
such a relationship with a client. Generally, Rule 2-01(b)(1) pro­
vides that an accountant is not independent if he, his firm, or any 
member of his firm has any direct financial interest or any material 
indirect financial interest in the client to be audited or any of its af-
78. Ibid.
79. 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01.
80. 17 C.F.R. 201.2(e).
81. 17 C.F.R. 201.2(e)(1). The Commission has exercised its power to suspend 
and censure practitioners many times, with increasing frequency in recent years. 
The Accounting Series Releases contain more than 30 cases of temporary or 
permanent suspensions of certified public accountants. The majority of these 
have occurred within the last 10 years; the SEC has also increasingly accepted 
resignations of accountants against whom investigative proceedings have been 
initiated.
The authority of the Commission to discipline those who practice before it 
was recently reaffirmed in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,415 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
82. See, e.g.. Accounting Series Release No. 47 (January 25, 1944); Account­
ing Series Release No. 81 (December 11, 1958); Accounting Series Release No. 
126 (July 5, 1972).
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f i l i a t e s . 83 A similar provision is embodied in the AICPA’s Rules of 
Conduct.84 Both the Commission and the AICPA have interpreted 
their rules to prohibit any direct financial interest in a client, no 
matter how small.85
The Commission and the AICPA have also provided that certain 
specific associations between an accountant and his client will impair 
independence. For example, Rule 2-01 (b)(2) of Regulation S-X86 
and AICPA Rule of Conduct 101B87 generally provide that an ac­
countant will not be independent of any client with which he, his firm, 
or a member thereof was, during the period to be reported on or at 
the date of the report, connected as promoter, underwriter, voting 
trustee, director, officer, or employee.8
These two basic rules—no financial interests and no prohibited 
business relationships or associations—form the foundation for several 
interpretations concerning independence. Thus, the Commission and 
the AICPA have issued interpretations and rulings relating to family 
relationships of auditors and clients,89 indemnity agreements between 
auditors and clients,90 financial interests in, or official association with, 
clients by retired partners of auditors,91 litigation between and involv­
ing auditors and clients,92 and auditor performance of bookkeeping 
services for clients.93
83. 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(b).
84. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.01.
85. For the Commission’s rulings, see, e.g., Accounting Series Release No. 22 
(March 14, 1941); Accounting Series Release No. 81 (December 11, 1958); 
Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972). For the profession’s rulings, 
see AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 191, et seq.
86. 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(b)(2).
87. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.01.
88. See Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972) and Accounting 
Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977) for other business relationships 
which raise independence questions.
89. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977); Accounting 
Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972); AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, 
ET §§ 101.05, 191.043-.054, and 191.099-.100.
90. Accounting Series Release No. 22 (March 2, 1941).
91. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977); AICPA, 
Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET §§ 101.03, 191.029-.030, and 191.073-.074.
92. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 251 (July 6, 1978); Accounting 
Series Release No. 234 (December 13, 1977); AICPA, Professional Standards, 
Vol. 2, ET § 101.07.
93. E.g., Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1976); AICPA, Pro­
fessional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 101.04. For a discussion of this subject, see 
C. Blough, Practical Applications of Accounting Standards 67-69 (AICPA
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There have also been specific interpretations and general statements 
from the Commission and the AICPA concerning the furnishing of 
MAS by auditors. The profession has stated that the role of an in­
dependent accounting firm in performing MAS is to provide advice 
and technical assistance to a client while providing for participation in 
the analytical approach and process.94 This has been stated to be “the 
only basis on which the work should be done and it is the only basis on 
which responsible management should permit it to be done.”95 Indeed, 
AICPA Ethics opinions provide that if the auditor makes manage­
ment decisions on matters affecting the company’s financial position 
or results of operations it could appear that his objectivity as an in­
dependent auditor of the company’s financial statements might well be 
impaired.96
Rule 101 of the AICPA’s Rules of Conduct precludes a member or 
his firm from expressing an opinion on the financial statements of an 
enterprise which he or his firm serves in any capacity equivalent to 
that of a member of management or of an employee. In furnishing 
MAS to audit clients, auditors must take this into account.
In 1958 the Commission commented on the independence of the ac­
countant who is so closely identified with his client that he makes 
decisions that should be made by management. The Commission 
said;
Another reason for finding a lack of independence . . .  is the fact that 
some accountants intending to certify financial statements included in 
such filings have been interested in serving the client’s management, 
or in some cases large stockholders, in several capacities and in doing 
so have not taken care to maintain a clear distinction between giving
1957), and J. Carey and W. Doherty, Ethical Standards of the Accounting Pro­
fession 37-39 (AICPA 1966).
94. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410.01.
95. Ibid.
96. AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 12, “Independ­
ence,” 1963.
Adhering to the role limitation is more difficult with respect to small clients 
than with large ones, and small CPA firms tend to have a higher portion of 
small clients among their total clientele. A small company, the extreme of 
which is the “one-man shop,” cannot afford expert staff of its own in many areas. 
The owner is much more likely to turn to his CPA firm for advice on many 
matters, because of his own lack of time or capacity, and much more likely to 
follow the advice given. The testimony of spokesmen for smaller firms heavily 
engaged with such clients presented a picture of small CPA firms doing much 
good for small businessmen but also a picture of circumstances in which ad­
herence to role limitations seemed difficult, to say the least. However, these 
same spokesmen strongly rejected an exception based upon smallness, at least 
as long as the role limitation is imposed as a condition of independence.
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advice to management and serving as personal representatives of man­
agement or owners and making business decisions for them.97
Occasionally a client will seek to engage its independent accounting 
firm for a project in which the client wants to be involved only to a 
limited extent, if at all. According to the AICPA Committee on 
Management Services, an auditor must be wary of a role in which he 
assumes exclusive control over the design and implementation of 
changes. “Only client management is in a position to assume responsi­
bility for all aspects of change (including operations) and, therefore, 
ultimate success is most likely to be achieved when both consultant 
and client management recognize this fact and arrange their roles 
accordingly.”98
Two ethics rulings analyze the problem of impairment of indepen­
dence when specific services are involved. First, the AICPA has con­
cluded that an accounting firm’s independence would not be impaired 
if it provided actuarial services to an audit client (the results of which 
are incorporated in the client’s financial statements) where “all of the 
significant matters of judgment involved are determined or approved 
by the client and the client is in a position to have an informed judg­
ment on the results.”99
The second ruling concerns executive search activity. Generally, 
AICPA ethics rulings prohibit a member from hiring for a client a 
controller or cost accountant since hiring decisions are management 
decisions which cannot be made by the auditor without impairing in­
dependence. The rulings, however, would permit a member to per­
form services, such as “recommending a position description and 
candidate specifications, searching for and initially screening candi-
97. Securities and Exchange Commission, 23rd Annual Report for Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 1957, at 184 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958).
98. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430.19. The Committee on
Management Services promulgated the following criteria for accepting an en­
gagement which includes implementation:
1. The client understands the nature and implications of the recommended 
course of action.
2. Client management has made a firm decision to proceed with implementa­
tion based on this understanding and consideration of alternatives.
3. Client management accepts overall responsibility for implementation of the 
chosen course of action.
4. Sufficient expertise will be available in the client organization to fully com­
prehend the significance of the changes being made during implementation.
5. When the changes have been fully implemented, client personnel have the 
knowledge and ability to adequately maintain and operate such systems as 
may be involved.
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430.22.
99. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 191.107-.108.
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dates, and recommending qualified candidates to the client” for the 
client’s ultimate decision.100
The AICPA’s interpretations regarding actuarial services and ex­
ecutive search reflect the Board view that it has taken on the question 
of scope of services and its relation to auditor independence. The 
AICPA’s Council, in 1961, stated it to be “an objective of the Insti­
tute . . .  to encourage all CPAs to perform the entire range of 
management services consistent with their professional competence, 
ethical standards, and responsibility.”101 In its Opinion No. 12, the 
AICPA’s Committee on Professional Ethics determined that “there 
is no ethical reason why a member or associate may not properly per­
form professional services . . .  in the [area of] management advisory 
services, and at the same time serve the same client as independent 
auditor.. ."102
The Commission and the AICPA have taken a rigid, prophylactic 
approach in pronouncing that certain audit/client relationships will 
impair independence. This is most apparent with respect to financial 
interests in clients and certain formal associations with clients. In 
the area of MAS relationships, however, a more fluid approach has 
been embraced. In answering the general question of whether MAS 
does impair independence, and, if so, whether it should be proscribed 
in any respect, the Board believes that this same fluid approach should 
prevail.
The effect of MAS on independence
Actual Impairment. From the voluminous record before the Board, 
it is apparent that documented evidence of MAS abuses or impair­
ment of independence through the use of MAS is virtually nonexis­
tent.103 Many concerned persons point to a feeling that “it doesn’t
100. Ibid., at § 191.111-.112. But see Appendix B to the Organization Docu­
ment (Addendum A of this Report) which prohibits members of the SEC Prac­
tice Section from engaging in certain executive search services for audit clients 
whose securities are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
This is discussed at pp. 82-84, infra.
101. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 410.03.
102. See note 7, supra.
103. The lack of incriminating evidence was mentioned repeatedly at the POB 
Hearing. POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 
28; D. Noonan, Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, Tr. 62; N. Auerbach, 
Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 70; H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 170, 177; 
J. Mason, Jr., The University of Alabama, Tr. 207, 216-17; S. Klion, Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 239; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, 
Tr. 283-84; S. Hebert, North Carolina Association of CPAs, MAS Committee, 
Tr. 299; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 305; R. Leisner, 
CPA, Tr. 355-56; H. Bernstein, Bernstein & Bank, Ltd., Tr. 363. It is also a
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look right” or a speculation that some services “might” or “could” 
impair independence,104 but no one can counter the demonstrated 
benefits of MAS with some proof that specific practices lead to actual 
impairment. Although charges against MAS are serious and con­
ceptually tenable, abolishing services that are deleterious in specula­
tion but are beneficial by wide acclaim would be unwise.105
The several surveys conducted over the years have suggested that 
a minority of financial statement users believe that an accountant’s 
independence could be impaired by his furnishing MAS to audit 
clients—indicating that furnishing such services may impair the ap­
pearance of independence. Evidence of actual impairment resulting 
from MAS, however, has been difficult to find. One commentator 
from the accounting profession has strongly urged that none in fact 
exists:
Despite more than fifteen years of research—much of which conducted 
by persons, however sincere their motives, with an apparent precon­
ception about the impropriety of MAS—the record of MAS practice 
as it relates to audit independence is unblemished: Not a single com­
promising instance has been presented. Both equity and reason would 
seem to suggest that the question has been answered adequately.106
The two special committees established by the AICPA107 to study 
this problem failed to find any evidence of actual impairment of in­
dependence after years of performance of MAS for audit clients. The 
Ad Hoc Committee on Independence interviewed Dr. Arthur Schulte 
(author of an article which surveyed the opinion of users of financial 
statements regarding the impairment of independence of accountants) 
when preparing its own report, and he stated that he had addressed 
inquiries to all of the state boards of accountancy asking if they had 
ever had any case in which they had to take disciplinary action on in­
dependence where the rendition of management services was a factor.
recurrent theme in professional studies on the subject, but the Board is puzzled 
as to what weight it should be given. Specific evidence of loss of independence 
through MAS, a so-called smoking gun, is not likely to be available even if 
there is such a loss. On the other hand, the assumption by congressional staff 
and other studies that MAS must corrupt lacks persuasion because of its 
a priori foundation without empirical verification.
104. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: E. Boynton, American Academy of 
Actuaries, Tr. 106-07; C. Watson, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, 
Tr. 124-26; R. Cardinal, Lester B. Knight & Associates, Inc., Tr. 138-39.
105. Support for MAS has been widespread among accounting firms that 
practice MAS, academics, and client companies. See the discussion of MAS 
benefits at pp. 16-21, supra.
106. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 78.
107. Ad Hoc Committee on Independence, 1969 Final Report, supra note 4; 
Committee on Scope and Structure, 1974 Final Report, supra note 4.
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He advised the Committee that he had heard from 44 of the state 
boards and that not one of them reported it had ever had such a case.
Finally, one mechanism which potentially could reveal whether 
the independence of auditors has actually been impaired is our legal 
system. Research conducted by the Cohen Commission, however, 
produced only one case that could arguably have involved an actual 
impairment of independence on the part of auditors.108 One com­
mentator cited a few other cases109 which were considered by the 
Cohen Commission before reaching its conclusion, but, otherwise, 
there have been no instances of litigation concerning this issue.10
While the available empirical evidence does not reveal any actual 
instances where the furnishing of MAS has impaired independence, 
the Board recognizes that the nonexistence of such evidence does not 
necessarily mean that there have not been instances where indepen­
dence may have been impaired. Not all situations where an auditor’s 
objectivity is compromised will result in a lawsuit. Accordingly, the 
absence of any known cases, while comforting, does not serve to 
prove conclusively that independence has not been, or will not be, 
impaired due to the furnishing of MAS to audit clients.1
108. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 102. In the Westec case, 
auditors advised on the accounting effect of prospective merger transactions and 
were involved in the company’s merger and acquisition program. Research 
conducted at the University of Texas at Austin yielded similar results. Re­
searchers searched U.S. Supreme Court decisions from 1938 to March 1977, 
U.S. Court of Appeals decisions from 1945 to April 1977, and U.S. District 
Court decisions from 1960 to March 1977 and judicial decisions in courts of 
eleven states. Few cases were found which were relevant and none where the 
actions of the auditors were determined to be improperly influenced by the 
furnishing of MAS to audit clients. G. Grudnitski and J. Robertson, “Addi­
tional Evidence on Auditor Independence When Management Services Are 
Performed,” College of Business Administration, The University of Texas at 
Austin. Received with letter in response to the Notice from Associate Pro­
fessor J. Robertson.
109. A. Briloff, More Debits Than Credits (Harper & Row, 1976), 283.
110. The Cohen Commission’s analysis of legal cases did not disclose any other 
examples besides those cited by Professor Briloff, and their survey of audit staff 
members failed to indicate any significant relationship between the provision of 
MAS and substandard audits.
In three of the four cases cited by Professor Briloff, the accountants perform­
ing MAS learned of information that reflected unfavorably on the audit and 
on unaudited financial statements. As the Cohen Commission Report notes, 
the fault was not the result of a conflict when the audit was performed, but was 
the failure to act when learning of adverse facts during the MAS engagement. 
The cases suggest that MAS can add strength to the audit process by giving the 
auditors access to more information. The fourth case was the Westec case 
referred to in note 108, supra. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 97.
111. See note 103, supra.
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Appearance of Impairment. The problem of impairment of inde­
pendence when an accounting firm furnishes MAS to an audit client 
is not so much lack of independence in fact as the appearance of lack 
of independence. Closeness to management, which many persons 
view as a by-product of providing MAS, places the auditor in a posi­
tion where outside observers become concerned as to his independence.
Surveys of users of financial statements, however, have been in­
conclusive regarding the effect of MAS on auditor independence. 
These surveys have severally concluded: (i) that there is a problem 
with the accountant’s appearance of i n d e p e n d e n c e ;12 (ii) there is no 
problem in this area;13 or (iii) the evidence is conflicting and no 
conclusions may be d r a w n . 14 This division in the literature illustrates 
the difficulties inherent in measuring such an intangible quality as 
the appearance of independence.
The surveys have shown, however, that those people most familiar 
with the MAS provided by auditors are far less concerned about a 
possible impairment of independence than those who are less familiar 
with the situation.15 The difference in perception of a possible im­
pairment of independence is related to a knowledge of the scope of 
MAS furnished by auditors. This has given rise to the assertion that 
an auditor must not only appear to be independent to a reasonable 
person in possession of all the facts, but also to an “unreasonable” 
person who has no knowledge of this area. Lack of such knowledge 
could produce a “psychological” uncertainty as to whether the services 
would impair independence.116
112. A. Briloff, “Old Myths and New Realities in Accountancy,” supra note 
4, at 484-95; A. Schulte, “Compatibility of Management Consulting and Audit­
ing,” supra note 4, at 587-93.
113. P. Titard, “Independence and MAS— Opinions of Financial Statement 
Users,” supra note 4, at 47-52.
114. R. Hartley and T. Ross, “MAS and Audit Independence: An Image 
Problem,” supra note 4, at 42-51; D. Lavin, “Perceptions of the Independence 
of the Auditor,” supra note 4, at 41-51; G. Hobgood and J. Sciarrino, “Man­
agement Looks at Audit Services,” supra note 4, at 26-32; G. Hobgood and J. 
Sciarrino, “Management Looks at Audit Services (Part II),” supra note 4, at 
24-25; D. Miller, “The Annual Audit Revisited,” supra note 4, at 38-44.
115. P. Titard, “Independence and MAS,” supra note 4.
116. Query whether the appearance to a reasonable observer is an adequate 
standard. While, on the one hand, it seems unreasonable to ask the profession 
to curtail useful, profitable, and harmless activities to cater to the suspicions of 
unreasonable observers, if enough observers were to perceive MAS in general 
or some types of service in particular as seriously impairing independence, the 
profession would be in trouble and should do something about it, even though 
the perception was unreasonable and not founded in fact. These considerations 
help explain and support the recent ban on executive recruiting services. In 
other cases the appropriate professional response might be to use disclosure and
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One commentator has argued that many of the researchers who 
questioned the independence of an auditor who performs MAS have 
started with the hypothesis that auditing and MAS are somehow 
incompatible. Using questionnaires, information was compiled on 
the attitudes of informed users of financial statements toward this 
hypothesis. “[N]one of these studies developed research findings, 
rationale or any specific instance which would justify curtailment of 
MAS as currently performed by auditing firms."17
Since some of the surveys discussed above seem to indicate that 
the concern of users about the potential conflict between MAS and 
the audit function “decreases as their familiarity with the nature of 
services offered by public accounting firms increases,”118 a solution 
to the appearance issue would seem to be the education of these 
“concerned users” through disclosure. It is possible that there may 
be a lack of understanding as to the specific role the auditor plays 
in rendering MAS.
The AICPA, through its Management Advisory Services Execu­
tive Committee, has been successful in informing the CPA of his 
expected role in MAS. It may be advisable for the AICPA to in­
crease its efforts to provide similar information to members of the 
financial community in order to inform them as to what the account­
ing profession expects of auditors who render MAS. This would 
give users of financial statements a better basis upon which to form 
judgments about MAS and independence. In this connection, the 
AICPA should place special emphasis on those specific services 
perceived to be closely related to management. It still remains the 
responsibility of the auditor to take all necessary precautions to 
safeguard independence and to avoid acts which may appear to 
justify the fears expressed about MAS.
The idea of disclosure and education, however, is not a novel one. 
In 1966 the AICPA prepared a document which attempted to edu­
cate the general business community regarding the nature of manage­
ment advisory services as performed by independent public account­
ing f i r m s . 19 The 1969 Ad Hoc Committee on Independence recom­
mended that in any discussion of MAS with user groups, emphasis 
should be placed on the role played by the auditor.120 These past 
efforts indicate that any future program of disclosure must be com-
audit committee or board of directors surveillance to change the public 
perception.
117. S. Klion, “MAS Practice: Are the Critics Justified?,” supra note 4, at 
77-78.
118. Cohen Commission Report, supra note 4, at 96.
119. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol 1, MS §  410.03.
120. 1969 Final Report, supra note 4.
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prehensive and specifically designed to ease the appearance problem 
with MAS, Nothing less will suffice.
Independence as an absolute
The existing studies, although generally supportive of the conclusion 
that performing MAS does not impair independence in fact, are 
quite inconclusive concerning whether any particular management 
advisory services impair the appearance of independence. Even con­
ceding, for the sake of argument, that furnishing a wide variety of 
such services to audit clients does impair the appearance of inde­
pendence and assuming that additional public awareness of the true 
nature of accountants’ advisory activity will not allay the suspicions 
of all observers, the inquiry cannot end there. Independence is not 
and never has been a status which public accountants achieve or have 
achieved in any absolute sense. Thus, before jumping from a conclu­
sion that furnishing certain services to audit clients could result in 
the impairment of independence in appearance (or even in fact) to 
a conclusion that public accountants be barred from furnishing such 
services to their audit clients, it is judicious to look at what other 
relationships presently exist between accountants and clients which 
raise similar independence questions but which have been accepted 
by the profession and the public.
As indicated above, independence has traditionally been defined 
by the profession as the ability to act with integrity and objectivity— 
integrity being an element of character, and objectivity being an 
accountant’s ability to maintain an impartial attitude on all matters 
which come under his view. It is this second element of independence 
—objectivity—which precludes the attainment of independence in any 
absolute sense. A significant conflict of interest exists in every audi­
tor/client relationship by virtue of the fact that the client selects the 
auditor and pays the fee.121 Acceptance of this conflict is, in part, 
based on practical necessity. In addition, a good deal of reliance is 
placed on the first element of independence—integrity—in recogniz­
ing that objectivity can be compromised to some extent without un­
duly impairing independence.12
Similarly, accountants have been performing tax advisory services
121. The existence of this significant conflict was recited on several occasions 
during the course of the Board’s hearings. POB Hearing Testimony: P. Arn­
stein, John F. Forbes & Company, Tr. 46-47; R. Mautz, Ernst & Ernst, Tr. 152; 
H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 176; H. Moss, Altschuler, Melvoin 
and Glasser, Tr. 240; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 
306; H. Bernstein, Bernstein & Bank, Ltd., Tr. 373.
122. Other pressures to act properly, in accordance with professional standards, 
cannot be overlooked. These include legal liability, professional discipline and 
loss of reputation. See AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.08.
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for years. Indeed, one of the more significant factors responsible for 
the growth of the accounting profession was the adoption of the 
16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 providing for 
federal income tax.123 The public, and certainly the SEC, have been 
acutely aware that independent accountants perform a wide array 
of tax reporting and advisory services. It is not uncommon for an 
accounting firm to be closely involved in assisting management in 
determining the provision for taxes appearing on the income state­
ment and the accrual appearing on the balance sheet even though 
that same firm will review the appropriateness of those provisions in 
rendering its opinion on the fairness of the financial statements. Not­
withstanding this fact, the public has accepted the audits conducted 
by the same accounting firm without undue concern that somehow 
independence has been impaired.
Some persons might propose that tax advisory services are dis­
tinguishable from MAS because a third party—the U.S. Government 
—conducts its own audit, serving as an additional check on the 
accountant’s performance.124 Others may argue that tax services are 
entitled to some sort of de facto grandfathering in this area, since 
they have been performed for so many years.
The Board does not believe the foregoing arguments represent the 
primary justification for permitting independent accountants to per­
form tax advisory services. The Internal Revenue Service audit, for 
example, is not conducted until some years after financial statements 
are published—hardly adequate protection for shareholders. While 
the argument that tax advisory services simply be accepted under some 
theory of grandfathering has some appeal, the Board believes there 
are other reasons for accepting tax advisory services which are more 
substantive and which bear on the larger question whether accountants 
should be permitted to furnish MAS to audit clients.
Accountants historically have assisted management in calculating 
the net income of the corporation. Accordingly, accountants were 
a natural profession to turn to for assistance in determining taxes 
which in large measure are based on net income and other financial 
bases requiring utilization of accounting concepts. Financial report­
ing and rendering opinions on the fairness of financial statements 
require a review and understanding of the appropriateness of the 
provisions for taxes appearing on the income statement and the 
related accruals appearing on the balance sheet. If tax services 
could not be performed by the same accounting firm engaged to 
conduct an audit, a significant amount of work would have to be
123. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
124. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: D. Gustafson, American Academy of 
Actuaries, Tr. 115.
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duplicated without any appreciable public b e n e f i t . 125 Indeed, the 
Board believes that in some cases the result of separating those func­
tions could produce significant economic waste, and in some cases 
would deny clients the best tax advice reasonably available to them. In 
addition to these benefits realized by the clients, and hence share­
holders, furnishing tax advice may result in benefits to the audit 
generally due to a more direct awareness of the client’s tax posture 
and other factors.126
These practical considerations, coupled with the integrity of the 
accounting profession and other external forces which come into 
play127 lead Board to conclude generally that accountants should 
not be made to curtail the furnishing of MAS to audit clients; they 
also lend further substance to the argument that independence in an 
absolute sense has not been achieved historically and probably would 
not be desirable to attain even if possible.
Those who have criticized accountants for furnishing MAS to audit 
clients have pointed to the potential for self-review, the possibility 
of engaging in management decisions, and the possible incentive for 
misrepresenting audit results because of a desire to continue furnish­
ing MAS.128 These criteria cannot be ignored, but they suggest an
125. Letters in response to the Notice from: McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & 
Company, July 31, 1978; A.M. Pullen & Company, August 2, 1978; John F. 
Forbes & Company, August 8, 1978.
126. Letters in response to the Notice from: A. M. Pullen & Company, August 
2, 1978; Coopers & Lybrand, August 1978; Touche Ross & Co., August 17, 
1978; Hurdman & Cranstoun, August 15, 1978. Responses to Securities Act 
Release No. 5869: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. at 8-9; Touche Ross & Co. 
at 7.
127. See note 122, supra.
128. The profession, of course, has faced the question of the potential conflict 
of interest in performing MAS. The following excerpts from the Concepts of 
Professional Ethics reflect this problem:
CPAs continually provide advice to their clients, and they expect that this advice 
will usually be followed. Decisions based on such advice may have a significant 
effect on a client’s financial condition or operating results. This is the case not only 
in tax engagements and management advisory services but in the audit function as 
well. . . .  It must be noted that when a CPA expresses an opinion on financial 
statements, the judgments involved pertain to whether the results of operating de­
cisions of the client are fairly presented in the statements and not on the under­
lying wisdom of such decisions. It is highly unlikely therefore that being a factor 
in the client’s decision-making process would impair the CPA’s objectivity in judg­
ing the fairness of presentation. The more important question is whether a CPA 
would deliberately compromise his integrity by expressing an unqualified opinion 
on financial statements which were prepared in such a way as to cover up a poor 
business decision by the client and on which the CPA has rendered advice.
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.14-.17. See notes 61 and 65 
supra, for a discussion of a potential conflict which may result due to a con­
tinual disproportionate amount of fees attributable to MAS.
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analysis of independence which disregards the fact that some relation­
ships between auditors and clients, even though posing potential con­
flicts, are accepted because of practical necessity or because they 
produce countervailing benefits. Especially when such other relation­
ships are questioned because they impair independence in appearance, 
rather than independence in fact, it would be contrary to the public 
interest to impose artificial restrictions which will deny the realization 
of possible countervailing benefits.
Where there is no countervailing benefit from permitting certain 
relationships to exist and where there is not otherwise a practical 
necessity for the relationship, more prophylactic measures are entirely 
appropriate. This is most apparent with respect to the proscription 
of financial relationships. While it may be entirely reasonable to 
expect that an independently wealthy accountant has not lost his 
independence by owning $100 worth of a client’s stock, the AICPA’s 
Code of Professional Ethics and the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission rules would not permit such ownership under pronouncements 
relating to independence. This approach is justifiable on the ground 
that it is easy not to own client stock and owning such stock does 
nothing which appears to improve the accountant’s ability to conduct 
an audit or otherwise serve any public interest.
Existing Safeguards
The public has accepted the notion that independence in an absolute 
sense does not exist, and several factors, some recently created, 
constitute substantial procedural safeguards that can further protect 
against the impairment of independence of auditors.
Client Awareness and Public Exposure
Due to new disclosure requirements imposed on issuers by the 
proxy rules and imposed on members of the SEC Practice Section by 
membership criteria of that Section, shareholders and other interested 
members of the public will be aware of the extent of MAS furnished 
by members of the Section generally and the amount furnished to 
individual clients relative to audit services furnished to those clients. 
Long a basic premise underlying the federal securities laws, disclos­
ure operates to “clear the air” and to reduce suspicion. Most import­
antly, disclosure serves to conform conduct to public expectations and 
demands.129
129. Reliance on disclosure— as opposed to proscribing special services—was 
also part of a program which Professor John C. Burton, former Chief Ac­
countant of the SEC, urged the Board to endorse. POB Hearing Testimony: 
Tr. 305-306. Professor Burton generally urged that the SEC Practice Section
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ASR 2 5 0, 13released this year, announces new regulations re­
quiring companies to disclose in proxy materials all nonaudit engage­
ments and the fees therefrom as a percentage of the audit fee.131 It 
further requires disclosure of whether the company’s audit committee 
or board of directors approved such engagements and whether the 
approval was granted before or after commencement of the engage­
ment. In the future, therefore, these disclosures will inform share­
holders of the magnitude of nonaudit fees compared to audit fees and 
whether the amount of nonaudit services disclosed appears appropri­
ate.132 They also reveal whether a company’s audit committee or 
board of directors gave appropriate consideration to the possible 
effect on the auditor’s independence, and ultimately should decrease 
concern by shareholders about nonaudit engagements.13
should not adopt scope of services limitations beyond those presently contained 
in the AICPA’s Code of Professional Ethics. He did, however, suggest three 
positive steps to improve the appearance of independence problem. Professor 
Burton urged that (1) the SEC Practice Section peer review include a review of 
the reviewed firm’s entire practice, rather than limiting the review to its account­
ing and auditing activities; (2) auditing standards be changed to require consulta­
tion between the audit staff and the MAS staff and to require the audit staff to 
review MAS work papers; and (3) reports filed with the SEC Practice Section 
by members should require disclosure of total fees paid by each client, identify­
ing the clients and breaking down the components of the total fee between 
auditing services, tax services, and MAS.
130. ASR 250, supra note 4. The concept of disclosure was discussed at the 
POB Hearing Testimony: H. Gunders, Price Waterhouse & Co., Tr. 172-73; 
S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 252-54; J. Burton, Columbia 
Graduate School of Business, Tr. 307-08, 318-21, 327-28. Disclosure was also 
discussed in most responses to Securities Act Release 5869. The majority of 
accounting firms oppose such disclosure.
131. Item 8(g) of Schedule 14A, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,039 (effective 
after September 30, 1978). The SEC has recently issued interpretations of the 
requirements to guide issuers on how to disclose relationships with independent 
public accountants in proxy statements. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 25 (Nov. 
2, 1978).
132. The Commission has recognized that the ratification of accountants by 
shareholder vote is a desirable action to strengthen the accountant’s independ­
ence. Accounting Series Release No. 126 (July 5, 1972). Ratification by more 
informed shareholders lends additional support to that position.
133. ASR 250 has received criticism from CPA firms and from business execu­
tives on several grounds, and the Board understands that some effort may be 
made to persuade the Commission to withdraw of substantially modify the rule 
changes announced in that Release. In this report, the Board accepts ASR 250 
as a fact and relies in part on the public information that it will produce and 
the corporate board or committee procedures that the new disclosures are 
stimulating. If these fundamental aspects of ASR 250 are removed, the Board 
will have to reconsider its views and consider whether there are other devices 
that it can recommend to achieve the same results.
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Management’s close relationship with auditors whose firms also 
provide MAS might suggest to some a situation in which the auditor 
and management would be too closely identified with each other. Ap­
propriate disclosures, however, should allow the marketplace to work 
by revealing to shareholders and directors the auditor’s relationship 
with management to promote the auditor’s independence not only in 
fact, but also in appearance. Whatever can be gleaned from such dis­
closure, such as extraordinary management advisory services or the 
absence of audit committee or board approval, will serve as impetus 
for the board of directors to decide initially whether its auditor is and 
will remain independent and to avoid engagements that could en­
danger independence or could be so perceived. Such disclosure, 
therefore, creates a self-imposed pressure on management to consider 
carefully whether any particular services offered by its auditors might 
impair independence or be perceived as impairing independence.
Additional information will also be produced by virtue of mem­
bership in the SEC Practice Section. As a condition of membership 
in the Section, SEC audit clients must receive reports from members 
disclosing the total fees received from the client for MAS furnished 
during the year under audit and a description of the types of services 
r e n d e r e d . 134 A client’s board of directors or audit committee, there­
fore, receives a mandatory report on MAS provided by the company’s 
auditor and can satisfy itself as to the auditor’s independence. Coupled 
with the disclosures required under ASR 250, which should create 
subtle pressures to scrutinize carefully all MAS engagements, this 
membership requirement should also stimulate audit committees and 
boards of directors to utilize these reports in evaluating MAS and its 
effect on auditors’ independence.
Membership in the SEC Practice Section will also obligate mem­
bers to file annually with the Section gross fees for accounting and 
auditing, tax, and MAS expressed as a percentage of total gross fees. 
Such information is open to public inspection.135 With these figures, 
shareholders and the general investing public can review the relative 
amount of nonaudit work individual auditing firms perform and assess 
whether their primary service of auditing financial statements is being 
diluted. If the public or boards of directors are concerned with any 
such trend, they can respond by engaging audit firms that have not 
chosen that course.
While the annual filing will provide additional data on the relative 
importance, in terms of fees, for MAS, tax, and auditing and account­
ing services, it will not reveal the relative importance of MAS to ac-
134. Organization Document, Section IV, 3(g)(12).
135. Organization Document, Section IV, 3(j).
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counting and auditing as furnished only to audit clients. The Board 
believes that such data could be helpful to observers concerned with 
this question and to the Board in any future examination of this 
question. Accordingly, the Board recommends adding to the Or­
ganization Document a requirement that members’ annual disclosure 
statements under Section IV, 3(g) of that document include disclosure 
of gross fees for both MAS and tax services performed for audit 
clients, expressed as a percentage of aggregate fees charged.
The Board believes that reliance on disclosure with enhanced audit 
committee or board of directors surveillance is a far better approach 
than imposing prophylactic proscriptions, since individual factors and 
special situations can be considered in each case. Users of financial 
statements, including boards of directors and audit committees, should 
be given time to evaluate the importance of the new disclosure rules 
in assessing auditor independence.
Incentives for Independence
Another factor that ensures the maintenance of auditor independence 
is grounded in the professional ethics of accountants. Acceptance of 
responsibility to the public is one of the distinguishing features of a 
profession; accountants have accepted the responsibilities placed on 
them by the government, the business community, and the public at 
large, all of whom rely on accountants for fair financial reporting and 
professional advice on business problems. The independence of 
auditors is a characteristic imposed by accountants on themselves not 
only as a matter of personal professional integrity, but also as a 
response to their responsibilities to their various publics. As in­
dicated earlier,136 the AICPA’s Code of Professional Ethics and MAS 
Professional Standards require that members be independent of their 
clients by maintaining their integrity and objectivity when expressing 
opinions on financial statements.137 Failure to maintain independence 
is enforceable by a Trial Board that may, after a hearing, admonish, 
suspend, or expel a member from the AICPA.
In addition to professional discipline, accountants may be subject 
to SEC sanction, pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Prac­
tice, if they fail to maintain an independent status.138 An auditor has 
further incentives to retain his honesty and integrity when dealing 
with a client, since he is faced with substantial liabilities at common 
law and under the general antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
136. See pp. 26-30, supra.
137. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 101; Vol. 2, ET § 51.01.
138. See p. 29, supra.
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ties laws. Potential damages from individual and class actions pro­
vide incentive to auditors to preserve carefully their independence and 
to cooperate with the new disclosure provisions discussed earlier to 
create adequate safeguards for the investing public.
AlCPA Peer Review Process
Mandatory peer reviews conducted within the AICPA structure pro­
vide another check on the independence of auditors. The SEC Practice 
Section requires its members to undergo peer review at least every 
three years.139 The program, administered by the Peer Review Com­
mittee of the SEC Practice Section, has several objectives, including 
determining whether member firms maintain and apply quality con­
trols in accordance with standards established by the AICPA Quality 
Control Standards Committee and whether such firms meet member­
ship requirements.140 As the reviews are structured now, emphasis is 
on the quality control system of a firm’s accounting and auditing prac­
tice which, of necessity, includes review of the procedures for main­
taining independence with respect to audit clients.
The Board does believe, however, that the process should be ex­
panded to require a more careful review of MAS engagements per­
formed for audit clients. While the Board does not believe that the 
peer review process should include a review of the quality control pro­
cedures applied to an MAS engagement itself, it does believe that 
MAS engagements should be reviewed to determine whether they 
impaired the auditor’s independence in rendering an opinion on the 
fairness of the client’s financial s t a t e m e n t s . 14 The efficacy of such an 
inquiry depends on developing some agreed upon formulation of at­
tributes relative to MAS and relevant to independence. At the present, 
these attributes seem generally to center on the auditor’s role in con­
nection with furnishing MAS. That is, the auditor must be limited 
to serving in an advisory capacity and refrain from making manage­
ment decisions or participating in the conduct of operations.142 By in-
139. Organization Document, Section IV, 3(c).
140. Ibid., Section VIII, 3.
141. A more careful review of MAS engagements was generally supported by 
witnesses at the POB Hearing. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: C. Vanatta, 
Arthur Young & Company, Tr. 30-31; N. Auerbach, Coopers & Lybrand, Tr. 
92; J. Mason, Jr., The University of Alabama, Tr. 213-14; S. Klion, Peat, 
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 243, 258-59; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive 
Committee, Tr. 280; J. Burton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 307.
142. This proposition is embodied in the present standards and has been sup­
ported by many witnesses before the Board. E.g., POB Hearing Testimony: 
D. Noonan, Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, Tr. 67-68; N. Auerbach, Coopers 
& Lybrand, Tr. 92; T. Testman, Ernst & Ernst, Tr. 166-68; H. Moss, Altschuler,
45
vestigating these facets of MAS, peer reviewers not only may better 
meet the objectives of the process, but they may also generate some 
data on the interplay of MAS and independence that will enable the 
Board to consider this matter at a later date with a stronger factual 
basis.
Specific Services Mentioned in the Organization 
Document and Proposal
As indicated above, the Board generally believes that, when possible, 
questions relating to scope of services should be answered in general 
terms rather than by attempting to analyze specific services and draw­
ing hard, sometimes crude, lines around permissible and impermissible 
MAS. Nonetheless, some discussion of the specific services mentioned 
in the Organization Document and the Proposal is warranted.
Marketing Consulting, Plant Layout and Design,
Product Design and Analysis, and 
Employee Benefit Consulting
The Proposal contains a discussion of the following: (1) executive 
recruiting services; (2) marketing consulting services; (3) plant lay­
out and design services; (4) product design and analysis; (5) insurance 
actuarial services; and (6) employee benefit consulting services.
Appendices A and B of the Organization Document and Appendix 
A of the Proposal discuss certain types of services under the general 
rubric of marketing consulting, plant layout and design, and product 
design and analysis, which are or would be permissible and certain 
types which are or would be proscribed. The existing and proposed 
proscriptions are predicated on the conclusion that the skills required 
for performing the proscribed services are nonfinancial in nature or 
are not related to accounting or auditing. Inasmuch as the Board 
recommends that the skill related criterion not be imposed, it would 
recommend that the specific proscriptions concerning those services 
contained in the Organization Document and the Proposal be de­
leted. This does not mean that the Board believes accountants 
should perform architectural or engineering services, act as a general 
contractor in constructing a building, or develop a new product. 
But, the Board is not aware that those services and others specified 
under the general subject matter under discussion are furnished by 
accounting firms in any event. If such services and other similar
Melvoin and Glasser, Tr. 227; S. Klion, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Tr. 
237; M. Elliott, AICPA, MAS Executive Committee, Tr. 271; L. Dowell, 
McGladrey, Hansen, Dunn & Company, Tr. 290.
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services are being furnished, as a result of ASR 250, that fact will be 
revealed in the client’s proxy statement. If it then appears that ac­
countants are engaged in services which are likely to impair their 
image, further consideration of this question may be necessary.
The Board also does not believe, as a general matter, that furnish­
ing marketing consulting, plant layout, and product design and 
analysis services will impair an accountant’s independence if per­
formed in a manner consistent with existing MAS Professional 
Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics relating to independ­
ence.143 Notwithstanding the above, the Board recognizes that this 
is a very broad area, and it is possible that under some circumstances 
independence could be impaired. To attempt to identify in the ab­
stract what those circumstances might be, however, would be an 
exercise in futility. The Board, therefore, subscribes to the Com­
mission’s early advice that “the question of independence is one of 
fact, to be determined in the light of all the pertinent circumstances 
in a particular case.”144
The question of independence is raised in the Proposal with re­
spect to employee benefit consulting, and general guidelines are 
established which are largely duplicative of existing MAS Professional 
Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics.145
As with the services discussed above, the Board does not believe
143. See notes and 145 and 159, infra.
144. Accounting Series Release No. 47 (January 25, 1944). This leaves open 
the question of who is to do the determining. Obviously the auditor has the 
duty to make the initial determination. So do the client’s management and its 
board of directors or audit committee—a duty which will be more apparent and 
no doubt be taken more seriously as a result of the disclosure occasioned by 
ASR 250. The SEC no doubt will continue to do the determining on cases 
brought to its attention. If the recommendations in this report are adopted, the 
determination will also be made in the course of peer reviews.
145. For example, paragraph (1) under the discussion of Employee Benefit 
Consulting in the Proposal (see Addendum B hereto) would provide that the 
member not assume managerial functions or the client’s responsibility for judg­
ments in several areas. See AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS 
§§ 110.04, 410.02, and 430 for the same limitation.
Paragraph (2) provides that, while services may be on a recurring or periodic 
basis, they should not require continuous involvement and therefore become an 
engagement to perform a management function. This limitation is related to the 
prior one and is probably covered by the MAS Practice Standards cited above. 
In addition the Code of Ethics prohibits members who audit clients from de­
veloping any relationship with the client in which the member is virtually a part 
of management. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 52.10.
Paragraph (3) requires that the member take precautions to assume that the 
client understands the recommendation so that it makes informed judgments. 
This requirement naturally follows from the others. If the client is expected to 
make all significant decisions based on the accountant’s advice, the accountant
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that furnishing employee benefit consulting services, as a general 
rule, would impair an accountant’s independence.146 Again, it is 
necessary to look at the facts and circumstances of each case and a 
broad injunction or permissive conclusion is inappropriate.
Actuarial Services
The furnishing of actuarial services, either to insurance companies 
or employee benefit plans, raises special questions which have been 
addressed by both sides, perhaps more completely than any other 
particular s e r v i c e . 147 The Board believes that the only serious ques­
tion is whether an accounting firm can furnish actuarial services to 
an audit client or regarding an audit client’s employee benefit plan 
without impairing its independence to render an opinion on the 
financial statements of the client or the client’s employee benefit plan. 
Accordingly, the Board is satisfied that there are no problems asso­
ciated with an accounting firm furnishing actuarial services to a 
nonaudit client. The question narrows down to whether an account­
ing firm should audit the financial statements of (1) an insurance 
company for which it also furnished actuarial services; (2) a client 
for which it acted as the enrolled actuary of the client’s employee
must be satisfied that his advice is not de facto decision making. See also, 
AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS § 430.22.
Paragraph (4) sets forth seven specific matters which would otherwise be 
prohibited because (1) they would associate the accountant too closely with 
management (maintenance of original records, custodian of securities, claim 
administration, and negotiating plan terms); (2) they would require making final 
decisions rather than rendering advice and might otherwise be prohibited by 
ERISA’s prohibited transaction sections (acting as investment advisor or some 
other fiduciary capacity); (3) are already expressly prohibited by the Code of 
Ethics, AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 2, ET § 302.01 (contingent fees).
146. Actuarial services furnished to employee plans are discussed separately 
below.
147. See POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., Tr. 10; 
R. Keating, A. S. Hansen, Inc., Tr. 94; E. Boynton, American Academy of 
Actuaries, Tr. 104; C. Watson, Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, Tr. 
125-28, 134. Letters in response to the Notice from: American Academy of 
Actuaries, August 14, 1978; A.S. Hansen, August 1, 1978, incorporating state­
ment to SEC, November 30, 1977; Conference of Actuaries in Public Practice, 
August 11, 1978; Coopers & Lybrand, August 10, 1978. Response to Securities 
Act Release No. 5869: A.S. Hansen, Inc.; American Academy of Actuaries; 
Coopers & Lybrand; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; George B. Buck, Consult­
ing Actuaries, Inc.
See also W. Dreher & C. Graese, “The Compatibility of Actuarial Consulting 
and Auditing Services,” supra note 4; B. Hazlehurst, “Auditor/Actuary Rela­
tions Under ERISA: As an Actuary Sees It,” supra note 4; T. Kelley and 
D. Roscetti, “Auditor/Actuary Relations Under ERISA: From the Auditor’s 
Standpoint,” supra note 4.
48
benefit plan; or (3) an employee benefit plan for which it also acted 
as the enrolled actuary.
Before discussing the foregoing question, the Board notes that it 
believes accounting firms should not be discouraged in developing 
their understanding of the actuarial science. A better understanding 
would seem to lead to more reliable audits where actuarial deter­
minations are an important part of a client’s financial statements.148 
Moreover, the Board is concerned that restricting the type of actu­
arial services an accounting firm can furnish to audit clients may 
restrict the overall level of actuarial activity of the firms and therefore 
limit the breadth of its skills. Among other things, the more re­
stricted the actuarial practice of the firm, the less likely it will be 
able to attract the most qualified actuarial personnel to its pro­
fessional ranks.149
Two separate but related arguments are advanced to support the 
notion that an accounting firm would not be independent to render 
an opinion on a client’s financial statements if it also served as an 
actuary for that client or for an employee benefit plan sponsored by 
that client. These arguments relate to the possibility that (1) the 
dual services will result in self-review;150 and (2) the actuary will 
not limit his role to providing advice and technical assistance. Since 
one of the purposes to be achieved by the role limitation is the 
avoidance of self-review, these arguments are related. Another 
purpose for a role limitation is to avoid appearing essentially as 
part of management’s team.
The question of self-review is sometimes addressed in the context 
of Statement of Auditing Standards No. 11 (“SAS 11”). SAS 11 
generally provides that an auditor obtain an understanding of the 
methods and assumptions used by a specialist, and need not perform 
comprehensive audit procedures or challenge the specialist’s methods 
or assumptions, unless his limited review procedures lead him to 
believe that the findings are unreasonable under the circumstances.151 
In the context of using the work of an actuary, an accountant, relying 
on SAS 11, must satisfy himself as to the professional qualifications 
and reputation of the actuary, understand the actuary’s methods and 
assumptions, and test the data supplied by management to the actuary;
148. POB Hearing Testimony: N. Auerbach, Coopers &. Lybrand, Tr. 82; J. 
Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 197-99.
149. POB Hearing Testimony: J. Seitz, Touche Ross & Co., Tr. 195; J. Bur­
ton, Columbia Graduate School of Business, Tr. 306, 310.
150. See, e.g., POB Hearing Testimony: G. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Co., 
Tr. 10; R. Keating, A. S. Hansen, Inc., Tr. 94-102; E. Boynton, American Acad­
emy of Actuaries, Tr. 104-07.
151. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 336.08.
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the accountant performing the audit does not duplicate the actuary’s 
work.
Insofar as an auditor must satisfy himself on the professional quali­
fications and reputation of the actuary, that judgment has obviously 
been made at the time the auditing firm agreed to hire its actuarial 
personnel and in all likelihood after much greater analysis and review 
of both objective and subjective criteria relating to the actuarial 
personnel than would be the case when evaluating third-party actu­
aries. It is unrealistic, therefore, to suggest that such a judgment can 
be better made by a stranger than an associate, partner, or employee 
of the auditor.152 Similarly, the Board does not believe it is objection­
able that an auditor tests the validity of client supplied data relied 
upon by the actuarial personnel of his firm. The Board understands 
that actuaries ordinarily do not test the validity of data supplied by 
management, at least not in any audit sense. Accordingly, the testing 
of that data often is done for the first time by the auditing firm, 
whether or not the actuarial work is performed by an actuary asso­
ciated with the auditing firm. In any event, even if the actuarial 
personnel tested such information, the Board believes that the auditing 
personnel would not be relieved from performing audit procedures to 
the same extent they would be performed if the actuary were not 
associated with the auditing firm. If this is not clear from existing 
auditing standards, SAS 11 should be clarified to so provide. Inas­
much as SAS 11 requires an auditor to understand an actuary’s 
methods and assumptions and to believe that the actuary’s conclusions 
are not unreasonable, there may be some credence to the argument 
that acting both as actuary and auditor for the same client can result 
in some self-review. This does not mean, however, that the limited 
self-review involved impairs the auditor’s independence or otherwise 
is harmful to the public or investors. First of all, it must be remem-
152. Critics, of course, may argue that once the initial hiring decision is made 
subsequent evaluation of the qualifications of a fellow employee or partner 
cannot be performed objectively. This is a problem not only with respect to 
MAS personnel but with respect to all personnel, including those on the audit 
staff. Accounting firms generally have overcome this by installing quality control 
procedures which require, among other things, periodic evaluation of hiring and 
promotion practices and compliance with the firms’ own continuing professional 
education requirements. The professional staff (including MAS personnel) of 
member firms of the SEC Practice Section are now required to adhere to pre­
scribed continuing professional education standards and the mandatory peer 
review must check for compliance. The Board believes that these safeguards 
overcome any serious concern that an accounting firm can not fairly evaluate the 
qualifications of its own employees. Additional safeguards would exist if the 
peer review were expanded to cover hiring practices with respect to MAS 
professional staff, but the Board is not prepared to suggest that this is essential.
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bered that the review is quite limited and is not duplicative of the 
work performed by an actuary.
Perhaps more important from the public’s standpoint is not the 
potential for self-review but the objectivity of the person performing 
actuarial services in the first place. The Board understands that it is 
not uncommon for insurance companies to rely exclusively on their 
own staff for actuarial expertise. While an auditor auditing financial 
statements of such a client would, under SAS 11, be required to 
employ more thorough procedures with respect to the actuary’s 
methods, assumptions, or findings (or engage an outside specialist 
for that purpose) than if the actuary were independent of management, 
he would not be required to duplicate the actuarial work performed.153
In the Board’s view, the use of a nonmanagement or nonemployee 
actuary in the first instance provides at least as much protection. In 
light of the very limited review an auditor is required to perform 
with respect to the findings of an actuary who is not related to man­
agement, little, if anything, is gained by requiring the actuary to be 
independent of the auditor. Because the Board perceives some po­
tential benefit to the quality of audits by allowing auditors to have 
in-house actuarial expertise, it does not believe the Executive Com­
mittee should adopt scope of services limitations which would dis­
courage that result by prohibiting the firm from furnishing actuarial 
services to audit clients.
Some persons have argued that an actuary cannot satisfy the 
requirement imposed by the AICPA’s MAS Professional Standards 
that, in performing MAS, an accountant must limit his role to advisor 
and not make management decisions.154 Since the role limitation 
relates to independence155 and the Board recommends that com­
pliance with those portions of the MAS Practice Standards and the 
AICPA’s Professional Code of Ethics relating to independence be 
made a condition of membership in the SEC Practice Section, this 
argument must be addressed.
The ability of an actuary to appropriately limit his role was most 
vigorously challenged with respect to acting as an enrolled actuary 
of an employee benefit plan. These challenges are prompted by Sub­
sections 103(a) and (d) of ERISA, which require that an actuarial 
statement be filed as part of a pension plan’s annual report and that 
the actuarial statement include an opinion of an “enrolled actuary,” 
as defined. Specifically, Section 103(a)(4)(B) provides as follows:
(B) The enrolled actuary shall utilize such assumptions and techniques
153. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, AU § 336.08.
154. AICPA, Professional Standards, Vol. 1, MS §§ 110.04, 410.01, 430.
155. Ibid., MS §410.01.
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as are necessary to enable him to form an opinion as to whether the 
contents of the matters reported . . .
(i) are in the aggregate reasonably related to the experience of the 
plan and to reasonable expectations; and
(ii) represent his best estimate of anticipated experience under the 
plan.156
Inasmuch as Subsection 103(a)(4)(B) requires the enrolled actuary 
to formulate his own best estimate of anticipated experience under 
the plan, it is difficult to maintain that an actuary acting in that 
capacity is simply giving advice. On the other hand, it is equally 
difficult to conclude that the actuary has usurped management’s role 
and is making management decisions. Rather, it appears to the Board 
that, in the context of an employee benefit plan, the enrolled actuary 
is simply performing an independent professional service outside of 
management’s traditional area of operation and expertise. It is not, 
therefore, making management decisions and should not be viewed 
as being part of management’s team. Accordingly, the Board does 
not believe that an accounting firm exceeds the role limitation men­
tioned above or otherwise impairs its independence as an auditor 
simply because it serves as enrolled actuary of an employee benefit 
plan and audits that plan or that plan’s sponsor.157
156. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 103(a)(4)(B) 
[emphasis added]. See also Section 412(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
which, in pertinent part, provides:
(3) For purposes of this section [determination of funding policy], all costs, 
liabilities, rates of interest, and other factors under the plan shall be determined 
on the basis of actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are 
reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expecta­
tions) and which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated 
experience under the plan [emphasis added].
157. This is consistent with the conclusion reached by the Department of 
Labor in an interpretive bulletin addressing the question of independence in the 
context of Section 103(a)(3)(A) of ERISA. That section requires that the ac­
countant rendering an opinion on the Plan’s financial statements to be contained 
in the annual report be independent. In pertinent part, the interpretation pro­
vides as follows:
An independent qualified public accountant may permissably engage in or have 
members of his or her firm engage in certain activities which will not have the 
effect of removing recognition of his or her independence. For example, . . . the 
rendering of services by an actuary associated with an accountant or accounting 
firm shall not impair the accountant’s or the accounting firm’s independence.
Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 75-1, 29 CFR § 2509-75-9.
Notwithstanding the foregoing interpretation, some commentators dispute 
that it is intended to permit an accounting firm to perform original actuarial 
services unless it expressly relies on the actuarial determinations when issuing 
its opinion on the financial statements. See, e.g., Response to Securities Act 
Release No. 5869 from American Academy of Actuaries, dated April 11, 1978.
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In examining the role limitation as applied to an insurance com­
pany actuary, more traditional analysis should be employed. Actuarial 
considerations for an insurance company are integrally related to the 
role and responsibility of management. Thus, if an accounting firm 
furnishes actuarial services to management of an insurance company 
audit client, care must be taken to satisfy the role requirements con­
tained in the AICPA’s MAS Professional Standards. This means gen­
erally that the actuary must only furnish advice to management and 
render assistance and that management must make the final decision. 
To do this, the accountant must be satisfied that the client has the 
expertise to understand the significance of his recommendations so 
that all of the significant matters of judgment involved are determined 
or approved by the client and the client is in a position to have an 
informed judgment on the r e s u l t s . 158 The Board does not believe that 
this standard can reasonably be met if an auditing firm is doing more 
than rendering supplementary actuarial advice.
On balance, therefore, the Board does not believe that an account­
ing firm should be prohibited from serving both as auditor and enrolled 
actuary for an employee benefit plan or from serving as auditor for 
a client and as enrolled actuary for that client’s employee benefit 
plans. When furnishing actuarial services to insurance company audit 
clients, care must be taken to limit those services to advice and tech­
nical assistance. To avoid the appearance of exceeding the limits of 
such an advisory role, accounting firms should not furnish actuarial 
services to insurance companies unless such services are supplemental 
to primary actuarial advice furnished by another actuary not associated 
with the accounting firm.
Executive Recruitment
The final area of discussion relates to executive recruiting services. 
The Executive Committee has added an Appendix B to the Organiza­
tion Document to prohibit members of the SEC Practice Section from 
searching for prospective candidates for managerial, executive, or 
director positions with its audit clients. The limitation, however, does 
not prohibit an accountant from giving a client the name of prospective 
candidates (including employees of the accounting firm) and it does not 
prohibit an accountant, on the request of a client, from interviewing 
candidates for financial, accounting, administrative, or control posi­
tions and advising the client on the candidates’ competence in those 
areas.
158. See note 99, supra.
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In addition to the foregoing, the amendment prohibits an account­
ing firm from engaging in psychological testing or other formal 
evaluation programs or from undertaking reference checks for candi­
dates for executive or director positions on behalf of a client. Finally, 
accountants are forbidden to act as negotiators on an audit client’s 
behalf in determining such things as title, compensation, and other 
conditions of employment.
The Board accepts the Executive Committee’s decision in this 
area. At a minimum, engaging in active recruiting services creates 
an appearance of an independence problem. And, there appear to be 
little, if any, audit benefits derived from furnishing such services. The 
one benefit the Board does see is the interjection in the interview and 
evaluation process of an accountant’s expertise in accounting and 
financial controls. It would, in the Board’s view, be a mistake to deny 
management the views of its independent accountants concerning the 
competency of a candidate for accounting or other financial positions. 
This benefit is preserved in the amendment and permits members of 
the SEC Practice Section to interview candidates and evaluate their 
competence in financial, accounting, administrative, or control posi­
tions.
The Board also believes it is important to note that recruiting 
services, as such, are available from other sources. Thus, the restric­
tion will not result in depriving audit clients of valuable and necessary 
services. Because the restricted services would, if furnished, create 
an appearance of impairment of independence, and because pro­
hibiting such services will neither deny the public any audit benefits 
nor deprive the client of a necessary service unavailable from other 
responsible sources, the Board concurs in the Executive Committee’s 
decision.
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Summation
In general, the Board has concluded that maintenance of independ­
ence should be the only limitation on scope of services and that in­
dependence be assessed after giving consideration to potential benefits 
derived from furnishing various services and recognizing that in­
tegrity and risk of civil liability and administrative sanctions can 
offset some loss of objectivity. To implement this general conclusion 
the Board recommends reliance on existing programs and procedures 
and suggests that adherence to the portions of the existing MAS 
Professional Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics dealing 
with independence be made a condition of membership in the SEC 
Practice Section.159 As indicated in the body of this report, however, 
the Board believes the Executive Committee decision of July 26, 1978, 
to restrict certain executive recruiting services can be supported and 
should not now be disturbed.
In formulating its conclusions and recommendations the Board has 
considered the various conflicting views and the arguments pressed 
in their support. It is evident that there is no formula to accommodate 
all the views and interests involved, and the Board recognizes that 
those whose views are contrary to the conclusions reached here are 
not likely to be convinced.
However, the Board believes that its conclusions are sound and 
that the Executive Committee in its Proposals was starting down a 
road that could lead only to an administrative quagmire. A program 
of making authoritive ad hoc determinations, on either hypothetical 
or actual cases, of which services do and which do not involve 
auditing and accounting skills can only lead to confusion, frustration, 
and inequity. On the other hand, such radical surgery as the Senate 
Report suggests, that is to say banning all MAS, save tax and internal 
control advice and assistance, while clear and simple, seems far more
159. Aside from the general admonition appearing throughout the MAS 
Professional Standards and the Code of Professional Ethics concerning inde­
pendence, other pronouncements impose the following limitations: (1) members 
must avoid assuming the role of management and limit their role generally to 
that of providing technical assistance and advice (MS §§ 110.04, 410.01, and 
430 and ET §§ 191.109-.110); (2) members must not become involved in any 
relationship with management that causes them to become virtually a part of 
management or under management’s control (MS § 410.09 and ET § 52.10); 
and (3) members may not charge contingent fees for their services (ET § 302.01).
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draconian than the record justifies. Nevertheless, there is enough 
concern about the scope of services in responsible quarters so that 
the question cannot be dismissed as a “nonproblem.” The Board 
believes that there is potential danger to the public interest and to 
the profession in the unlimited expansion of MAS to audit clients, 
and some moderating principles and procedures are needed.
These principles lie in the established axiom that auditors must 
maintain independence, plus the corollary that the role of auditors 
in providing MAS, if beyond advice and technical assistance, may 
destroy independence or appear to do so to a significant degree. The 
appropriate procedure lies in the peer review process and the dis­
closures occasioned by ASR 250 and the SEC Practice Section, all 
of which are new, and in reliance on audit committee or Board of 
Director- surveillance. The Board has therefore concluded that the 
SEC Practice Section should reassert the principles of independence 
and of role as an advisor as they relate to MAS, revise the peer review 
procedures to search for adherence to these principles, and observe 
the effects of the new disclosures and the information they will provide.
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ADDENDUM A
Organizational Structure and Functions 
of the SEC Practice Section of the 
AlCPA Division for CPA Firms*
Section IV. Membership
3. Requirements of Members
Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the following:
(a) Ensure that a majority of members of the firm are CPAs, that the 
firm can legally engage in the practice of public accounting, and 
that each proprietor, shareholder, or partner of the firm resident 
in the United States and eligible for the AICPA membership is a 
member of the AICPA.
(b) Adhere to quality control standards established by the AICPA 
Quality Control Standards Committee.
(c) Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s accounting and audit practice 
every three years or at such additional times as designated by the 
executive committee, the reviews to be conducted in accordance 
with review standards established by the section’s peer review 
committee.
(d) Ensure that all professionals in the firm resident in the United 
States, including CPAs and non-CPAs, participate in at least one 
hundred twenty hours of continuing professional education over 
three years, but in not less than twenty hours in any given year.
(e) Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of each SEC engage­
ment which has had another audit partner-in-charge for a period 
of five consecutive years and prohibit such incumbent partner from 
returning to in-charge status on the engagement for a minimum 
of two years except as follows;
(1) This requirement shall not become effective until two years 
after a firm becomes a member.
(2) In unusual circumstances, the chief executive partner of a 
firm or his designee may grant no more than one two-year 
extension so long as there is an in-depth supplemental review 
by another partner, or
(3) An application for relief is granted by the peer review com­
mittee on the basis of unusual hardships.
(f) Ensure that a concurring review of the audit report by a partner 
other than the audit partner in charge of an SEC engagement is 
required before issuance of an audit report on the financial state-
* This excerpt is reprinted from AICPA, Division for CPA Firms SEC Practice Sec­
tion, Peer Review Manual (1978).
57
ments of an SEC registrant. The peer review committee may 
authorize alternative procedures where this requirement cannot be 
met because of the size of the member firm.
(g) File with the section for each fiscal year of the United States firm 
(covering offices maintained in the United States and its territories) 
the following information to be open to public inspection:
(1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership or corporation) and 
identification of domestic affiliates rendering services to clients.
(2) Description or chart of internal organizational structure and 
international organization (including the nature of relation­
ships maintained in each geographic region).
(3) Number and location of offices.
(4) Total number of partners and non-CPAs with parallel status 
within the firm’s organizational structure.
(5) Total number of CPAs (including partners).
(6) Total number of professional staff (including partners).
(7) Total number of personnel (including item 6, above).
(8) Number and names of SEC clients for which the firm is princi­
pal auditor-of-record and any changes of such clients.
(9) Number of SEC audit clients each of whose total domestic 
fees exceed 5 percent of total domestic firm fees and the 
percentage which each of these clients’ fees represent to total 
domestic firm fees.
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has complied with AICPA 
and SEC independence requirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation as required under 
generally accepted accounting principles and indicating wheth­
er such pending litigation is expected to have a material 
effect on the firm’s financial condition or its ability to serve 
clients.
  (12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing, tax, and MAS ex­
pressed as a percentage of total gross fees.
(h) Maintain such minimum amounts and types of accountants’ liabil­
ity insurance as shall be prescribed from time to time by the 
executive committee.
(0 When determining its scope of management advisory services, 
place primary emphasis on accounting and financial related areas*
* These areas would include the design and installation of systems (such as computer- 
based systems and procedures) and the performance of studies related to the account­
ing, general record-keeping, and control. This process relates to recording, compiling, 
analyzing, and communicating financial and economic information, expressed in 
money or other qualities. This process involves and provides support to the essential 
organizational functions, such as (1) sales and distribution of products or services; 
(2) protection and custody of assets; (3) procurement and use of raw materials, 
capital, and human resources; and (4) production of products or services. These 
complex functions are closely interrelated in an integrated system. The specific ele­
ments of the overall system interact with each other in many ways and at many levels 
of the organization. The process also embraces systems for planning and budgeting, 
including comparisons between planned results and actual results.
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and refrain from performing management advisory services engage­
ments for audit clients whose securities are registered with the SEC 
that—
(1) Would create a loss of the firm’s independence for the purpose 
of expressing opinions on financial statements of such clients.
(2) Are predominantly commercial in character and inconsistent 
with the firm’s professional status as certified public account­
ants.
(3) Are inconsistent with the firm’s responsibilities to the public.
(4) Consist of the following types of services:
(i) Psychological testing
(ii) Public opinion polls
(iii) Merger and acquisition assistance for a finder’s fee
(5) Will be proscribed by the executive committee after further 
study and which comprise portions of what is included under 
the broad classifications of marketing consulting and plant layout 
as tentatively outlined in Appendix A.
(6) May be proscribed by the executive committee from time to 
time after further study based on the concepts described above 
in Appendix A. (See resolution of executive committee, Ap­
pendix B.)
(j) Report annually to the audit committee or board of directors (or 
its equivalent in a partnership) of each SEC audit client on the 
total fees received from the client for management advisory services 
during the year under audit and a description of the types of 
such services rendered.
(k) Report to the audit committee or board of directors (or its equiva­
lent in a partnership) of each SEC audit client on the nature of 
disagreements with the management of the client on financial 
accounting and reporting matters and auditing procedures which, 
if not satisfactorily resolved, would have caused the issuance of a 
qualified opinion on the client’s financial statements.
(0 Pay dues as established by the executive committee and comply 
with the rules and regulations of the section as established from 
time to time by the executive committee and with the decisions 
of the executive committee in respect to matters within its compe­
tence; cooperate with the peer review committee in connection with 
its duties, including disciplinary proceedings; and comply with any 
sanction which may be imposed by the executive committee.
Appendix A— SEC Practice Section Organization
The impact on the audit independence of CPA firms of performing 
management advisory services for audit clients has been carefully studied 
many times in the past, most recently by the Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities. In no case have the studies identified instances where the 
auditor’s independence was in fact impaired by the performance of manage­
ment advisory services.
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Nevertheless, concerns continue to be expressed by lay observers of the 
profession. It may be that the perception of these observers would be 
altered if they had a better understanding of the role of CPAs in providing 
management advisory services. However, it is virtually impossible to 
communicate this understanding to the public at large, and it is expected 
that there will be a continuing belief by lay observers that auditors should 
refrain from performing certain types of consulting services for audit 
clients.
Because the image and perception of CPAs as being independent of 
their audit clients is vital to public reliance on their opinions on financial 
statements, it is intended that the executive committee of the SEC practice 
section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms may from time to time 
proscribe certain types of management advisory services based upon 
further studies and experience. As a general guideline, services which are 
related to accounting and financial matters will not be proscribed. Those 
which do not fall within this broad definition or are only remotely related 
will be the subject of continuing consideration for prohibition.
Examples of two types of services to be initially considered and the 
portions which may be proscribed are as follows;
Marketing Consulting
Marketing consulting services rendered to audit clients are limited to those 
which are significantly financial or internal control oriented in nature and 
respond to their needs for objective external insight, study, and evaluation. 
These are engagements that CPAs as a professional group are best qualified 
to perform.
Engagements of this type fall into two broad classes: (1) those where 
marketing activities are but one segment of a broader study, such as—
1. Operations or management audits of one or more business units or 
multiple functions of them.
2. Profitability studies of business units.
3. Review and reporting on prospective (forecast) results and the conduct 
of financial feasibility studies.
4. Services to improve existing business management systems, procedures, 
and practices (e.g., the development of management information/con- 
trol systems).
and (2) those where only marketing activities are under review, such as—
1. The study of financial and administrative controls applied to marketing 
activities, the operating consequences that result therefrom, and the 
cost-benefits that could accrue from modification of either.
2. Analysis of the internal and external marketing factors (e.g., price-cost 
relationships, product mix, competitive factors, industry and customer 
demand experience and outlook, and business constraints) in evaluating 
the potential change in profitability from various operating alternatives 
available for an existing product/service, business unit, or select 
elements thereof.
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3. Services similar to the foregoing with respect to an expanded or new 
product line, service, or facility (such as an addition to a hospital).
4. Services to improve existing marketing management systems, proce­
dures, and practices to improve financial or administrative control 
and competitive posture (marketing information systems).
The CPA should not render those types of marketing consulting services
which are essentially nonfinancial in nature and where financial or internal
control implications are remote or only indirectly involved. These poten­
tial services are multiple and include such activities as—
1. Purely subjective evaluations of any type, including the development 
and evaluations of attitude surveys of user/consumer/influence groups.
2. Development and conduct of market test activities.
3. Product design, engineering, and development of physical specifica­
tions.
4. Product quality control policy, specifications, and testing programs.
5. Development of advertising copy, media strategy, and time/space 
buying plans.
6. Development/evaluation of sales literature, aids, presentations, con­
tracts, and so forth, to be utilized in the selling situation.
7. Package design and engineering.
8. Technical evaluation of physical/usage characteristics of competing 
products.
9. Development or evaluation of product safety policy, standards, and 
so forth.
Plant Layout
In the broadest sense, plant layout includes the total design of a manufac­
turing or processing facility.
Such services as product design, site selection, and actual design and 
construction of productive facilities of manufacturing companies should 
not be performed by CPAs.
To the extent that the activity involves such areas as (1) determining the 
selection, control, and flow of costs of production (i.e., material labor),
(2) the financial feasibility of new, expanded, or modified product manu­
facture, (3) the optimum controls and positioning of raw material, in- 
process, and finished goods inventory, and (4) clerical layout and staffing, 
the performance of professional service falls within the financial and 
accounting expertise of CPAs.
Other Services
Other services may be proscribed from time to time by the executive 
committee after further study of such types of services as executive search 
and actuarial evaluation based upon concepts described herein and in the 
accompanying document.
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Appendix B— Resolution
WHEREAS, section IV 3(0(6) of the “Organizational Structure and Func­
tions of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for Firms” 
(organizational document) authorizes the executive committee to proscribe 
certain services which may be performed by member firms of this section 
for audit clients whose securities are registered with the SEC; and
WHEREAS, the executive committee, after further study and advice, 
believes that the action to be taken herein is consistent with the concepts 
expressed in section IV 3(0, as presently in effect, and with Appendix A 
of the organizational document;
IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, as follows:
Executive Recruiting Services
The hiring of persons for managerial, executive, or director positions is 
a function which is properly the client’s* responsibility. Accordingly, the 
role of the CPA firm in this function should be limited. The CPA firm 
should not—
1. Accept an engagement to search for, or seek out, prospective candi­
dates for managerial, executive, or director positions with its audit 
clients. This would not preclude giving an audit client the name 
of a prospective candidate previously known to someone in the CPA 
firm.
2. Engage in psychological testing, other formal testing or evaluation 
programs, or undertake reference checks of prospective candidates for 
an executive or director position on behalf of an audit client.
3. Act as a negotiator on the audit client’s behalf, for example, in deter­
mining position status or title, compensation, fringe benefits, or other 
conditions of employment.
4. Recommend, or advise an audit client to hire, a specific candidate 
for a specific job. However, a CPA firm may, upon request by the 
audit client, interview candidates and advise the client on the candi­
date’s competence for financial, accounting, administrative or control 
positions.
When an audit client seeks to fill a position within its organization which 
is related to its system of accounting, financial, or administrative controls, 
the client will frequently approach employees of the CPA firm directly as 
candidates or seek referral of the CPA firm’s employees who may be 
considering employment outside of the profession. Such employment from 
time to time is an inevitable consequence of the training and experience 
which the public accounting profession provides to its staff, is beneficial 
to all concerned, including society in general, and therefore is not pro­
scribed.
* The term “client” refers to a company whose securities are registered with the SEC.
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ADDENDUM B
Proposed Amendments
Proposed Amendment to Section IV, 3(f) of the 
Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC 
Practice Section of the AlCPA Division for Firms
(To Replace Previous Section IV, 3(0)
(0 When determining the scope of its services, not undertake an engage­
ment for its audit clients registered with the SEC where—
(1) The circumstances of that engagement impair the firm’s indepen­
dence for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the financial 
statements of such clients; or
(2) The skills required are not related to accounting or auditing.
From time to time, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section 
may issue interpretations to assist firms in applying these two criteria to 
their practice. The committee’s current interpretations are detailed in the 
appendix.
Proposed Amendment to Appendix of the 
Organizational Structure and Functions of the SEC 
Practice Section of the AlCPA Division for Firms
(To Replace Previous Appendix)
All professionals acknowledge that they have a dual responsibility for 
their work—a direct obligation to their clients as well as broader public 
responsibilities. In 1967, Roy and MacNeill, in their study, Horizons for 
a Profession, observed that the public accounting profession could be 
distinguished from the other professions by the degree to which it has 
recognized its responsibilities to the public. The events of the last ten 
years have accentuated the public accounting profession’s unique public 
responsibilities.
CPA firms have an obligation to conduct their practice in such a way 
as to maintain the public’s confidence in the public accounting profession. 
The firms which join the SEC Practice Section agree to perform only those 
services which are compatible with their responsibilities to the public. To 
achieve this objective, when determining the scope of its services, a member 
CPA firm will not undertake any engagement for its audit clients registered 
with the SEC where—
(1) The circumstances of that engagement impair the firm’s independence 
for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the financial statements 
of such clients; or
(2) The skills required are not related to accounting or auditing.
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This appendix has been prepared to help the firms apply these two 
criteria to specific situations in their practice. The following section defines 
the key phrases used in the criteria. The next section provides some sugges­
tions a firm might follow in implementing these criteria in its practice. The 
final section illustrates how these criteria might be applied to some selected
services.
Definition of Key Phrases
Firms and Clients
Throughout this appendix the terms “firm” and “client” are used. In each 
instance “firm” refers to a CPA firm which is a member of the AICPA 
Division for Firms, SEC Practice Section. “Client” refers to a company 
whose securities are registered with the SEC and which is an audit client of 
the member firm in question.
Independence
Independence is the cornerstone of the public accounting profession. It 
is the principal characteristic which distinguishes the public accountant 
from his peers in industry or the other professions. That critical distinction 
is vital to the public’s acceptance of the public accountant’s opinion. The 
public acknowledges the value of the CPA’s opinion, not only because 
of his tested skills but also because of his independence.
Independence is the ability to act with integrity and objectivity. Integ­
rity is a quality of character. Objectivity is an attitude of mind. Because 
of the nature of these traits and the difficulty of establishing their existence 
in a tangible way, the appearance of independence as well as independence 
in fact becomes important, particularly as it relates to the audit of publicly 
held companies.
For this reason the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics prohibits the 
expression of an opinion when relationships exist which pose a threat to 
a CPA’s independence, either in fact or in appearance. These relationships 
fall into two categories:
(1) certain financial relationships with audit clients
(2) where the CPA is virtually part of management or an employee under 
management’s control.
In determining which relationships pose a threat to a CPA’s indepen­
dence, in fact or in appearance, the profession uses the criterion of whether 
reasonable men, having knowledge of all the facts and taking into consider­
ation normal strength of character and normal behavior under the circum­
stances, would conclude that a specified relationship between a CPA and a 
client poses an unacceptable threat to the CPA’s integrity or objectivity.
Generally, a CPA firm’s services do not create financial interests in 
clients other than through compensation for services rendered. However, 
the amount of such fees should not be contingent upon the outcome or re­
sults of the service. More often, any question concerning the possible loss
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of independence as a result of professional services relates to the role 
or degree of involvement of the firm in the client’s affairs. The CPA firm 
must avoid any engagement where it assumes management’s responsibilities 
for decisions or operations of the client, either directly or through becom­
ing so extensively involved in assisting management that it appears to be 
a part of the client’s management team.
Because of their special interest in publicly held companies, the CPA 
firms which join the SEC Practice Section have a special responsibility to 
maintain the appearance as well as the fact of independence in their rela­
tionships with these clients.
Skills Related to Accounting
Accounting is a discipline which provides financial and other information 
essential to the efficient conduct and evaluation of the activities of any 
organization.
The information which accounting provides is essential for—
(1) effective planning, control and decision making by management
(2) discharging the accountability of organizations to investors, creditors, 
government agencies, taxing authorities, association members, contrib­
utors to welfare institutions, and others.
Accounting includes the development and analysis of data, the testing 
of their validity and relevance, and the interpretation and communication 
of the resulting information to intended users. The data may be expressed 
in monetary or other quantitative terms, or in symbolic or verbal forms.
Some of the data with which accounting is concerned are not precisely 
measurable, but necessarily involve assumptions and estimates as to the 
present effect of future events and other uncertainties. Accordingly, ac­
counting requires not only technical knowledge and skill, but even more 
importantly, disciplined judgment, perception and objectivity.
Accounting deals with the information needs of all organizational func­
tions of a company including, for example, the—
(1) procurement and use of raw materials, capital and human resources,
(2) production of products or services, and
(3) sales and distribution of products or services.
It serves as the common language for management as they carry out 
both their custodial and managerial responsibilities.
To evaluate the accounting for economic transactions, the CPA firm 
must understand the systems which provide the economic data, the essen­
tial functions of an organization as well as the essential processes of general 
management. Consequently the “skills and disciplines related to account­
ing” go beyond a knowledge of elementary accounting techniques. The 
pressures to supplement basic accounting skills with varied disciplines are 
a natural outgrowth of the desire to make the accounting process more 
effective in an economy which involves intricate business transactions, 
highly developed capital raising techniques, elaborate entity structures, the 
use of sophisticated management science techniques and computer capabili­
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ties, and extensive government regulation. In short, the CPA firm cannot 
evaluate the accounting for an economic transaction if it does not under­
stand it.
Skills Related to Auditing
The skills related to auditing are those which assist the auditor to evaluate 
a client’s reported accountabilities and transactions, as well as those 
which assist the auditor to evaluate the effective functioning of the under­
lying systems of internal control. Put another way, the effectiveness of the 
attest function of a CPA firm depends on the availability of the skills 
needed to ascertain the facts and to assess the measurement and reporting 
judgments involved.
Basic audit competence requires an understanding of the client’s business 
—its purpose, organization and systems, the inherent risks in the industry 
and in the particular company, and how all these factors interact. The 
complexity of business has been increasing in all aspects. At the same time, 
the public has been demanding that the auditing profession continually 
improve its ability to evaluate management’s representations and to detect 
errors, omissions, and improprieties. Auditors are also being urged to 
broaden the scope of their involvement, e.g., by becoming associated with 
unaudited financial data and “soft” information such as forecasts and 
current value estimates. All of these factors require that auditors continue 
to broaden as well as sharpen their skills. Participation by auditors in 
advisory services helps achieve this objective.
In order to make competent judgments in auditing, the auditor may 
require the assistance of those whose knowledge and experience is in 
disciplines beyond the technical training of the skilled accountant. Some 
CPA firms fill this need through the use of outside specialists. Other 
firms find it more satisfactory to hire such specialists on a full time basis. 
In either event the work of the specialist is an important element in fulfilling 
the audit function.
Implementation of the Scope of 
Services Criteria in a Firm’s Practice
(1) An Independence Policy
A CPA firm is expected to maintain its independence from its clients, 
giving careful consideration to all factors which might impinge on its 
independence. A firm will consider, for example, the impact of financial 
interests, personal relationships and performance of non-audit services. 
Each firm has an obligation to establish appropriate policies and to main­
tain an internal control system which evaluates the engagements to be sure 
that the firm’s independence is not compromised. The Peer Review, con­
ducted under the auspices of the SEC Practice Section, will evaluate the 
firm’s policy statement, and the effectiveness of its internal review mechan­
ism.
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(2) Board of Directors or Audit Committee Involvement
The CPA firm has the primary responsibility for maintaining an independ­
ent client relationship. Nonetheless, the client’s board of directors or its 
audit committee shares in that responsibility. In fact, the oversight pro­
vided by the board or an effective audit committee will help to reinforce 
the effectiveness of a CPA firm’s independence policies, and thereby 
strengthen public confidence in the relationship. In addition to providing 
the board or audit committee with an annual analysis of the services pro­
vided to that client during the year, as required under IV, 3(j), each CPA 
firm should periodically discuss with its client’s board or audit committee 
the scope of services it offers, describing how it applies the SEC Practice 
Section criteria to its practice.
(3) Management’s Role
A CPA firm should not render services to its clients where those services 
take the place of management decision making.
a. The CPA firm must assure that the proper relationship is maintained 
in all engagements with SEC audit clients. Each engagement must be 
carefully structured so that management is adequately involved in the 
project and makes managerial decisions that may be required along the 
way.
b. A CPA firm should not undertake an engagement unless it believes 
that management has sufficient understanding of the work to be done 
in order to properly carry out its management role and make informed 
decisions.
c. A CPA firm should not undertake an engagement which, because of the 
CPA firm’s continuous involvement, becomes an engagement to per­
form a management or operating function. This interpretation would 
preclude, for example, an engagement to manage a computer facility 
over a period of time. More generally, this interpretation requires that 
advisory engagements include provisions for management implementa­
tion and operation on an ongoing basis.
(4) Contingent Fees
A CPA firm should not undertake an engagement where its fees are con­
tingent on the outcome of the project. This interpretation would, for ex­
ample, preclude performing merger and acquisition studies on a contingent 
fee basis. Similarly, a firm should not undertake an engagement promising 
a specific profit improvement. This interpretation draws on Rule 302, of 
the AICPA Code of Ethics, and related Rulings 8 through 13.
Application of Criteria to Selected Services
The two criteria of “independence” and “related skills” are applied in this 
section of the appendix to the following areas of services;
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• Executive Recruiting
• Marketing Consulting
• Plant Layout and Design
• Product Design and Analysis
• Insurance Actuarial
• Employee Benefit Consulting
As the need arises the Executive Committee of the AICPA SEC Practice 
Section will apply the criteria to additional services and publish the results 
to all members of the SEC Practice Section.
Executive Recruiting Services
The hiring of persons for managerial, executive, or director positions is a 
function which is properly the client’s responsibility. Accordingly, the role 
of the CPA firm in this function should be limited. The CPA firm should 
not—
(1) Accept an engagement to search for, or seek out, prospective candi­
dates for managerial, executive, or director positions with its audit 
clients. This would not preclude giving an audit client the name of a 
prospective candidate previously known to someone in the CPA firm.
(2) Engage in psychological testing, other formal testing or evaluation 
programs, or undertake reference checks of prospective candidates for 
an executive or director position on behalf of an audit client.
(3) Act as a negotiator on the audit client’s behalf, for example, in deter­
mining position status or title, compensation, fringe benefits or other 
conditions of employment.
(4) Recommend, or advise an audit client to hire, a specific candidate for 
a specific job. However, a CPA firm may, upon request by the audit 
client, interview candidates and advise the client on the candidate’s 
competence for financial, accounting, administrative or control posi­
tions.
When an audit client seeks to fill a position within its organization which 
is related to its system of accounting, financial or administrative controls, 
the client will frequently approach employees of the CPA firm directly as 
candidates or seek referral of the CPA firm’s employees who may be con­
sidering employment outside of the profession. Such employment from 
time to time is an inevitable consequence of the training and experience 
which the public accounting profession provides to its staff, is beneficial to 
all concerned, including society in general, and therefore is not proscribed.
Marketing Consulting Services
The CPA firm should not render advisory services related to the marketing 
function which require skills that are not related to accounting or auditing. 
These precluded services include such activities as—
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(1) Purely subjective evaluations of any type, including the development 
or evaluation of consumer attitude surveys.
(2) Development or conduct of market test activities.
(3) Development or evaluation of advertising copy, media strategy and 
time/space buying plans.
(4) Development or evaluation of sales literature, aids presentations, con­
tracts, etc., to be utilized in the selling situation.
Certain advisory services relating to the marketing function, however, 
are oriented significantly toward accounting, financial, control or adminis­
trative function. Such services are appropriate because they require skills 
related to accounting or auditing. Engagements of this type are not pro­
scribed and fall into two broad classes:
(1) Those where marketing is but one segment of a broader study such 
as—
a. Operations or management audits.
b. Profitability studies of a business unit.
c. Reviews of forecasts and the conduct of financial feasibility studies.
d. Studies to strengthen business management systems.
(2) Those where only marketing activities are under review such as—
a. Studies of the effectiveness of financial and administrative controls 
applied to marketing activities.
b. Analysis of quantitative market factors which affect demand for a 
new or existing product.
c. Studies to improve the client’s market information systems.
Plant Layout and Design Services
In the broadest sense, plant layout includes the total design of a plant 
facility. The CPA firm should not render such services which require skills 
that are not accounting or auditing related. More specifically, services pre­
cluded include such activities as—
1. Evaluating the geological and engineering characteristics involved in 
site selection.
2. Architectural and engineering designing of production facilities and 
processes, or equipment to be utilized in such facilities and processes.
3. Assuming the general contractor role related to the building, installa­
tion or modification of facilities, processes or equipment.
4. Performance testing or other services related to the acceptance of facil­
ities, processes and equipment.
Some services which are related to plant layout and design may properly 
fall within the scope of a CPA firm’s services because they require account­
ing or auditing related skills. Examples of such services are those where 
the CPA firm assists its audit client to—
1. Improve the control and efficiency of operations.
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2.
3.
4.
Determine the financial feasibility of new, expanded, or modified pro­
duction facilities or processes.
Enhance the control and positioning of raw material, in process and 
finished goods inventory.
Determine the clerical layout and staffing levels.
Product Design and Analysis
Services related to product design and analysis which involve the analysis, 
research, design, modification, production and testing of physical prop­
erties or results should not be rendered by CPA firms because they require 
skills that are not accounting or auditing related. More specifically, CPA 
firms should not undertake engagements involving—
(1) Product design, engineering and development of physical specifications.
(2) Development of technical policy or specifications of quality control 
programs.
(3) Development or evaluation of product safety policy, standards, etc.
(4) Technical evaluation of physical or usage characteristics of competing 
products.
(5) Package design and engineering.
There are, however, certain aspects of product design and analysis which 
involve the analysis and estimation of the cost and profit aspects of product 
design and production, or the financial and administrative controls re­
quired to manage the product design and production activities. Because 
such advisory services require skills which are accounting or auditing re­
lated, they are a proper part of the CPA firm’s overall scope of services.
Insurance Actuarial Services
Actuarial skills are both accounting and auditing related. The bodies of 
knowledge supporting the actuarial and accounting professions have a sub­
stantial degree of overlap. Both professions involve the analysis of various 
factors of time, probability and economics, and the quantification of such 
analysis in financial terms. The results of their work are significantly inter­
related. Their professions are logical extensions of each other; indeed, they 
have practiced jointly for many years and even shared the same profes­
sional society in Scotland prior to their becoming established in the United 
States.
The work of actuarial specialists generally is necessary to obtain audit 
satisfaction in support of insurance policy and loss reserves. To assist them 
in meeting their audit responsibilities, a number of CPA firms have hired 
qualified actuaries of their own.
The actuarial function is basic to the operation and management of an 
insurance company. Management’s responsibility for this function cannot 
be assumed by the CPA firm without jeopardizing its independence. Be­
cause of the special significance of a CPA firm’s appearance of indepen­
dence when auditing publicly held insurance companies:
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(1) The CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory services 
involving the determination of policy reserves and related accounts to 
its audit clients unless such clients utilize their own actuaries or third 
party actuaries to provide management with the primary actuarial 
capabilities. This does not preclude the use of the CPA firm’s actuarial 
staff in connection with the auditing of such reserves.
(2) Whenever the CPA firm renders actuarially oriented advisory services, 
it must satisfy itself that it is acting in an advisory capacity and that 
the responsibility for any significant actuarial methods and assump­
tions is accepted by the client.
(3) The CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory services 
when the CPA firm’s involvement is continuous since such a relation­
ship might be perceived as an engagement to perform a management 
function.
Subject to the above limitations it is appropriate for the CPA firm to
render certain actuarially oriented advisory services to its audit clients.
Such services include—
(1) Assisting management to develop appropriate methods, assumptions, 
and amounts for policy and loss reserves and other actuarial items 
presented in financial reports based on the company’s historical ex­
perience, current practices and future plans.
(2) Assisting management in the conversion of financial statements from 
a statutory basis to one conforming with generally accepted account­
ing principles.
(3) Analyzing actuarial considerations and alternatives in federal income 
tax planning.
(4) Assisting management in the financial analyses of various matters such 
as proposed new policies, new markets, business acquisitions and rein­
surance needs.
Employee Benefit Consulting Services
Many types of benefit plans or programs are available to employees, in­
cluding pension or retirement plans, profit-sharing and thrift plans, em­
ployee stock ownership and other stock related plans, and death, disability, 
and medical plans. Because of the complexity of tax regulations, alternate 
accounting and funding principles, and the long range economic impact 
involved in establishing and maintaining such plans, clients frequently seek 
technical advice and assistance from their CPA firms. Advisory services 
pertaining to employee benefit plans are related broadly to three basic 
areas: plan design, periodic financial analysis of plan obligations and cost 
(actuarial valuations), and plan administration.
As a part of the economic or financial evaluation of some types of plans, 
principally pension and retirement plans, it is necessary to utilize various 
mathematical formulae relating to time value of money and statistical prob­
ability. Most such calculations today are made by use of general-purpose 
computer programs, with subroutines specifically selected to suit the partic-
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ular facts and circumstances. Although most accountants have some train­
ing in and understanding of such skills, including the use of computers, 
CPA firms which render such services frequently employ individuals spe­
cifically trained and qualified as actuaries. Certain compliance and valua­
tion reports required by ERISA, for example, must be signed by client per­
sonnel or independent consultants who have been qualified by the govern­
ment as enrolled actuaries.
Since the scope and nature of employee benefit advisory services, includ­
ing actuarial services, require skills and disciplines related to accounting 
and auditing, such services properly fit within the general scope of services 
for a CPA firm. Indeed the concurrent provision of employee benefit and 
accounting services by CPA firms has existed for many years. In rendering 
such services, however, the CPA firm must be satisfied that such involve­
ment will not compromise its professional independence or objectivity as 
an auditor. Accordingly, the role of the CPA firm in rendering such serv­
ices should be limited as follows:
(1) The CPA firm should limit its role to that of technical assistance and 
advice, and not assume the client’s managerial functions or the client’s 
responsibility for any significant judgments or assumptions implicit in 
plan design, in plan administration, or in the related actuarial com­
putations.
(2) Although various services may be updated or rendered on a recurring 
or periodic basis, the CPA firm should not render employee benefit 
consulting services which require the firm’s continuous involvement 
and therefore become an engagement to perform a management func­
tion.
(3) The CPA firm must satisfy itself that the client has sufficient under­
standing of the implications of the technical factors involved in a 
benefit plan and the alternatives considered in a benefit plan study, so 
that the client can make its decisions based on an informed business 
judgment and assume responsibility for its actions.
(4) The CPA firm should not render employee benefit consulting services 
which involve—
a. maintaining original records of employee or plan investment data,
b. retaining custody of securities or other benefit plan assets,
c. acting as investment advisor or making investment decisions,
d. deciding claim administration or benefit eligibility,
e. negotiating plan provisions with employee representatives or other­
wise representing employers in bargaining sessions,
f. assuming a fiduciary role as defined under ERISA or other appli­
cable statutes or regulations, and
g. accepting commissions or other contingent fees.
Subject to the above limitations, the CPA firm may properly render 
various employee benefit advisory services to its audit clients such as the 
following:
72
(1) Plan Design
a.
b.
c,
d.
e.
Help management develop estimates of cost, and possible tax and 
accounting consequences of alternative benefit formulae.
Help management analyze the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternatives for eligibility and vesting requirements, the methods of 
distributing benefits, various funding policies and vehicles, and 
other pertinent plan features.
Assist the client’s legal counsel in drafting the plan.
Assist management in connection with filing the plan with the In­
ternal Revenue Service for the purpose of obtaining a determina­
tion as to the plan’s “qualification” under the applicable provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA.
Assist the sponsor with filing and other requirements of regulatory 
agencies, such as the Department of Labor and the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation.
(2) Periodic Financial Analysis of Plan Obligations and Cost (Actuarial
Valuations)
a. Assist management in the periodic estimation of benefit obligations 
of ongoing pension plans and the determination of costs for mini­
mum funding requirements and allowable income tax deductions.
b. Help management analyze and estimate the impact of proposed 
changes in benefit plans or funding policies.
(3) Plan Administration
a. Assist management in the preparation or review of administrative 
manuals and procedures governing the plan’s operation.
b. Assist management in the preparation of filings required by the 
regulatory agencies.
c. Assist management in the preparation or review of communica­
tion materials describing the benefit programs available to em­
ployees.
73
